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FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(A) AS AN 
IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON? 
BRYAN L. ADAMSON*
ABSTRACT
 In this Article, the author explores Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a) and standard of review choice to determine whether appellate 
judges can exploit the Rule’s terms to pursue ideological goals. The 
author examines the operative terms of Rule 52(a)—namely, “findings 
of fact,” “clear error,” and “documentary evidence”—and concludes 
that they are so malleable as to give appellate judges wide discretion 
in deciding whether clear error, de novo, or some other standard of 
review is to be applied. The Article then goes on to identify a fact ty-
pology appellate courts invoke which also enables them to circumvent 
Rule 52(a) and engage in de novo review of a trial court’s factual find-
ings. The Article concludes that standard of review choices can serve 
as a prism through which to view a judge’s ideological predisposition, 
especially when those choices are made in an undisciplined, unprinci-
pled manner. The author argues that appellate courts’ treatment of 
Rule 52(a) and fact typology can impair decisional legitimacy, admin-
istrative efficiency, and comity between the trial and appellate courts. 
As Rule 52(a)’s malleable character and fact typology serve important 
jurisprudential functions, the author makes several recommendations 
to clarify decisional rules as they apply to standard of review and to 
mitigate unwarranted perception of ideological bias in making judg-
ments about the applicable standard of review. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) a decisional tool with 
which appellate judges can pursue ideological ends? If so, what 
should be done about it? In cases tried without a jury, Rule 52(a) is 
the standard appellate courts apply when reviewing trial court fac-
tual determinations. Rule 52(a) directs that “[f]indings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous.”1 A judgment as to whether Rule 52(a) 
applies often controls any ultimate decision to affirm, reverse, mod-
ify, or otherwise direct a consequence for the district court’s holding. 
Thus, to say that critical consequences flow from the appellate court’s 
standard of review2 choice is no overstatement.  
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). Federal Rule Civil Procedure 52(a) states 
in full:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in 
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions 
under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in subdivision (c) of 
this rule. 
 2. It is important to distinguish between standard of review and scope of review. A 
standard of review is the limit of review, or the extent to which and manner by which, a 
court will scrutinize the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or rulings. Often, the level of 
scrutiny given matters which touch upon constitutional rights (for example, rational basis, 
intermediate, strict) is also referred to as the standard of review, although in a narrower 
sense. The “scope of review” speaks to the “range of issues” the court will examine. Richard 
H.W. Maloy, “Standards of Review”—Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
603, 608 (2000) (“The applicable standard of review determines whether the trial court has 
committed an error. The scope of review defines what the reviewing court will examine to 
determine whether the trial court has committed an error.”); see also W. Wendell Hall, Re-
visiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1045, 1049 (1993); Kelly 
Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 14 
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 The decisive nature of Rule 52(a) warrants analysis to explore 
whether judges can urge, reject, or avoid its application to pursue 
ideologically consonant outcomes. The instance in which a judge, 
from the bench or by written word, articulates an unequivocal ideo-
logical bias is the easy case. It is also possible to limn from a series of 
opinions on, say, affirmative action, a jurist’s ideological philosophy. 
The hard case arises when assessing whether an appellate judge ob-
scures his bias behind a clear error, de novo,3 or some standard of re-
view in between. If an appellate court wants to reweigh the facts as 
found by a lower court, it may characterize the trial court’s factual 
findings as “legal conclusions” or “mixed questions of law and fact.” 
On the other hand, if an appellate court wishes to give the greatest 
deference to the trial court decision, then findings of fact will be re-
viewed only for “clear error.” Suspicion of judges making result-oriented 
standard of review choices is most palpable when the substantive issues 
in play carry broad moral, social, or political consequences. 
 Debate over ideological bias has been intense, recently evidenced 
by the bitter controversies over judicial opinions and the judicial ap-
pointment process. Current tensions surround opinions in which di-
visive public issues are being decided4 and questions as to where 
(1994). Rule 52(a)’s “clear error” standard is also to be distinguished from appellate 
review for “abuse of discretion,” which applies to the level of scrutiny given a trial 
judge’s evidentiary rulings. 
 3. Courts use “de novo,” “plenary,” and “independent” review synonymously. Maloy, 
supra note 2, at 611. 
 4. To appreciate the profound consequences of standards of review and how they can 
be ideologically driven, one need look no further than to the recent controversy involving 
Theresa Marie Schiavo, who, after suffering cardiac arrest from a potassium imbalance in 
1990, had been in constant nursing care. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2001). After it was ruled that she was in a persistent vegetative state, Ms. Schiavo’s 
guardian (and husband) was granted a request to order her hospice facility to cease hydra-
tion and nutrition. That request led to an emotionally charged contest by Ms. Schiavo’s 
parents, who sought to have their daughter’s feeding tube reinserted. Seven years after 
this conflict over end-of-life decisions consumed then literally exhausted the courts, public-
ity began to develop around the dispute. The parents prevailed upon the Florida governor, 
the United States Congress, and the President to intervene. See Maya Bell, Sophisticated 
Tactics Aid Schiavo’s Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 2005, at A1; Keith Epstein, 
Congressmen Rush Schiavo Bill, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 9, 2005, at 1; Abby Goodnough & Carl 
Hulse, Feeding-Tube Case Roils Washington and Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at 
A5; Notes, FYI Nation, Congress Steps into Schiavo Debate, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2005, at 
12. In response, Congress passed a law mandating that the case be reviewed de novo, at 
each federal court level. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1276-78 (11th 
Cir. 2005), Appendix. Public Law 109-3 required the Federal District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida to
determine de novo any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo within the scope of this Act, notwithstanding any prior State court de-
termination and regardless of whether such a claim has previously been raised, 
considered, or decided in State court proceedings. The District Court shall en-
tertain and determine the suit without any delay or abstention in favor of State 
court proceedings, and regardless of whether remedies available in the State 
courts have been exhausted. 
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along the ideological spectrum judicial candidates lie.5 In today’s cli-
mate, labeling a judge’s opinion as the sign of a “judicial activist” or 
“extremist” has become the rhetorical equivalent of drawing the line 
in the sand. “Legislating from the bench” is another pejorative catch-
phrase used to denounce judicial opinions. Many recognize those in-
vectives to merely mean “I didn’t agree with the decision”; however, 
their power in this age of political demagoguery as weapons to attack 
judges and their decisions cannot be underestimated.6
Id. at 1277. 
  In directing de novo review, Congress sought to have the matter retried as many times 
as possible, hoping that a federal court would eventually render an “ideologically correct” 
decision. The appellate court found Public Law 109-3 was unconstitutional, as it sought to 
mandate de novo review of state proceedings, which was “beyond Congress’s constitutional 
power.” Id. at 1274 (Birch, J., concurring). 
 The Act not only unconstitutionally attempted to set a standard of review for each fed-
eral court to follow, but also expressly denied “federal courts the ability to exercise absten-
tion or inquire as to exhaustion or waiver under State law.” Id. at 1274. In doing so, the 
Act violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Id. at 1274-75. The appellate court’s deci-
sion to refuse to reinsert Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube was called “judicial activism” by many, 
prompting a call by one congressman that the judges who refused to intervene “be held ac-
countable for their actions,” and resulted in death threats to one judge and Ms. Schiavo’s 
former husband. See Rick Klein, DeLay Apologizes for Blaming Federal Judges in Schiavo 
Case but House Leader Calls for Probe of ‘Judicial Activism,’ , Apr. 14, 
2005, at A9; Warren Richey, Judicial Aftershocks from the Schiavo Case,
, Apr. 4, 2005, at 02; Maro Robbins, Passing Judgment on Activist Judges,
, Apr. 24, 2005, at 1A; Richard Schmitt, The Terri Schiavo Case: 
Judicial Effect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at 22; Howard Troxler, At Painful Road’s End, 
May Peace Find Them, , Apr. 1, 2005, at 1B. 
BOSTON GLOBE
CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
 5. The tension is due in no small part to the new “transparency” and demystification 
of judicial decision making, the profound questions being raised in recent cases, and the 
politicization of the federal judicial appointment process. Where study of judicial opinions 
was once the exclusive bailiwick of the legal academy, judicial analysis has been democra-
tized. News analysts, issue advocates, talk show hosts, bloggers, politicians, pundits and 
community leaders alike have significantly moved judicial opinion interpretation into the 
mainstream. Today, actors within and outside of the legal academy initiate discourse upon 
“important” decisions, attempting to glean from those opinions a judge’s views on a host of 
moral, social, political, or legal issues. 
 Moreover, evolution within the legal academy has brought new perspectives into judicial 
reasoning and opinion analysis. This evolution has resulted in new legal disciplines explic-
itly directed toward the study of judicial decision making. Positive law scholarship, critical 
legal studies (and all of its subsets, such as race, “queer,” gender, latino/a), law and litera-
ture, interdisciplinary studies, legal empiricism, and law and society each, to important 
degrees, engage in searching exploration of judicial opinion text and subtext, the possibil-
ity of jurist objectivity, and the complex interrelationships between case subject (for exam-
ple, law and facts), object (litigants and the public), and arbiter (judge and/or jury). 
 6. For example, the confirmation process of Chief Justice John Roberts was framed by 
concerns over Supreme Court candidates who might “legislate from the bench.” See Press Re-
lease, The White House, President Announces Judge John Roberts as Supreme Court Nominee 
(July 19, 2005), available at http:// /2005/07/20050719-7.html 
(stating that John Roberts will “strictly apply the Constitution and laws, not legislate from 
the bench”). The selection and confirmation process of Justice Samuel Alito was 
framed in the same manner. See Press Release, The White House, President Nomi-
nates Judge Samuel A. Alito as Supreme Court Justice (Oct. 31 2005), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051031.html (stating that Alito “under-
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
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 Nor should the importance that attaches to standard of review 
choices be underestimated. All too often, however, judges, lawyers, 
and scholars do not fully appreciate the consequences which attend 
such choices. Judges do not appreciate the importance of decision 
making transparency to litigants and the public, failing to clearly ar-
ticulate their choice of standard when that articulation is warranted. 
Lawyers fail to appreciate the pivotal role choice of standard plays in 
articulating issues for appeal or in other aspects of trial practice. 
Both judges and lawyers confront difficulty in crafting findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in a way that will shield, or ensure, appel-
late review.7 Finally, scholars have devoted considerable scholar-
ship to judicial bias regarding standing8 and abstention9 princi-
ples; much less attention has been given to Rule 52(a) and stan-
dard of review doctrine. 
 The fact is that Rule 52(a) is malleable and can be evaded by ap-
pellate courts. There are four primary reasons. First, the Rule does 
not define the term “clearly erroneous”; although the Supreme Court 
has sought to give definitive meaning to the term,10 that definition 
has not been consistently applied by lower courts. Second, articulat-
ing findings of fact—which entails making sometimes subtle distinc-
tions between “facts” and the “law”—is more art than science for trial 
courts, giving appellate courts broad discretion to reclassify the trial 
court’s findings. Third, not only have courts effectively ignored Rule 
52(a)’s directive as it regards documentary evidence, the availability 
of electronically based trial records for appellate review expands the 
stands that judges are to interpret the laws, not to impose their preferences or priorities on 
the people”). 
 7. “It is difficult to overstate the practical significance of the standard of review.” 
Hall, supra note 2, at 1049; see also Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review: The Meaning 
of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (1997) (standards of review “provide functional defi-
nitions of the advocate’s scope of appeal, the power of a reviewing court to rule on that ap-
peal, and depending upon the standard of review utilized, an influence on the outcome of 
an issue”); Kunsch, supra note 2, at 13 (“Practitioners should pay attention because it de-
termines what/how to argue/the likelihood of success on appeal.”); Judge Paul R. Michel, 
Effective Appellate Advocacy, 24 LITIG. 19 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is an issue on every appeal. 
So is the standard of review.”); Nevin Van de Streek, Why Not “Findings of Law” and 
“Conclusions of Fact” and Opinions About Both?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 109 (1994) (lawyers 
“twist[ ] in agony” when asked to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law).   
 8. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rule-
making, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999); Gene R. Nichol Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on 
Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985); Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial 
Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548 
(1993); Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, ); 
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (2004).  
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995
 9. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, The ALI, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Constitutional Case, 1995 BYU L. REV. 819 (1995); Barry Freidman, A Revisionist Theory 
of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989); Lisa Vanderhoof, Indian Law, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 815 (1996).  
 10. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
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notion of what constitutes a “document” and arguably diminishes 
traditional rationales for subjecting documentary evidence to review 
under a “clearly erroneous” standard.
 Finally, though Rule 52(a)’s plain language makes no exceptions 
to the type of evidentiary fact found, appellate jurisprudence has de-
veloped a typology of facts: “historical,” “ultimate,” “constitutional,” 
“legislative,” “sociological,” “scientific,” “political,” “economic,” and 
“jurisdictional.” In appellate opinions, how and why a fact is classi-
fied within this typology is an often-veiled determination. The ra-
tionale for classifying a fact under one of these types is important to 
know, because with the exception of “historical” facts, all other fact 
types take on legal dimensions11 and move appellate review into de
novo territory. While Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard gives the 
highest degree of deference to a trial court’s factual findings, a ple-
nary review determination “allows a court to do precisely what it is 
not permitted to do when the standard of review is deferential”12—
that is, redecide the issues litigated. 
 Rule 52(a)’s pliant character, along with appellate power to clas-
sify facts, enables judges to urge, avoid, or circumvent the Rule alto-
gether. Moreover, appellate courts’ often cavalier approach toward 
Rule 52(a)’s applicability fuels speculation that judges exploit the 
Rule’s malleable nature or indeed utilize it to achieve ideologically 
consonant results. In any event, appellate court determination of an 
applicable standard of review offers a unique prism through which to 
examine jurist ideological disposition. Unprincipled application, cir-
cumvention, or avoidance of Rule 52(a) raises other critical issues 
which go to the heart of the precepts long a hallmark of our judicial 
system: legitimacy, efficiency, and comity.13
 Part II of this Article attempts to set the stage for the discussion 
of Rule 52(a), describing three cases in which the applicable standard 
of review was the subject of controversy. Part III examines the his-
tory of Rule 52(a), noting its evolution out of debate surrounding the 
scope of authority between the trial and appellate courts, and the 
most efficient means by which to allocate decision making. Part IV 
places Rule 52(a) in the broader context of what courts do, with Part 
V taking up its operative terms and expanding upon the use of fact 
typology. Part VI raises pointed concerns about appellate court 
 11. But see discussion of historical facts, infra Part V.D.1.  
 12. Bosse, supra note 7, at 369; Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and 
the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 508 (1969) (noting Wright’s la-
ment over the “ ‘[t]he esoteric theories by which appellate courts pretend that questions of 
fact have somehow become questions of law, and thus can be decided anew by the appellate 
judges.’ ”); Charles A. Wright, The Federal Courts—A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. 
J. 742, 748 (1966).  
 13. Hon. John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate 
Courts—Is the “Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 426 (1981).  
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treatment of constitutional and legislative facts and how those fact 
types uniquely impact the appellate approach to standard of review 
choice. Part VII revisits the cases described in Part II, explaining 
how each court’s approach to standard of review choice arguably il-
luminated the ideological predispositions of the opinion’s author. 
Part VIII discusses appellate treatment of Rule 52(a) and fact typol-
ogy and how various jurisprudential concepts, including allocation of 
power and authority interests, are advanced or impaired by such 
treatment. Finally, Part IX sets forth ways to clarify appellate 
courts’ approach to standard of review choice and mitigate the 
possibility or perception of ideological bias through their standard 
of review determinations. 
II.   URGING, AVOIDING, OR CIRCUMVENTING RULE 52(A): THREE CASE 
STUDIES
 To place the discussion of Rule 52(a) and fact typology into con-
text, it is useful to introduce three cases, Concrete Works of Colorado, 
Inc. v. City & County of Denver;14 Easley v. Cromartie;15 and Equality
Foundation v. City of Cincinnati.16 They will be expanded upon later 
in this Article. Each case has at its core controversial substantive is-
sues, that is, affirmative action/race and gender, race/voting rights, 
and sexual orientation. As we will see, each case demonstrates that 
the circumstances in which Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard should 
be applied can be unclear at best, controversial to be sure, and ideo-
logically driven at worst. 
A.   Urging Rule 52(a)’s Applicability to Uphold the Trial Court’s 
Decision?
Calling a judge’s legal conclusion a finding of fact is an all too easy 
way for appellate judges to obscure or even avoid legal issues when 
the result of the trial suits them.
–Judge Henry J. Friendly17
 Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in Con-
crete Works18 illustrates how Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard is 
urged when the trial court decision appears to be ideologically conso-
nant with an appellate judge’s views. When a government-created 
minority and women set-aside program is challenged on its constitu-
 14. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 
2003).
 15. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 16. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th 
Cir. 1995). 
 17. Ruby v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 11, 23 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 18. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003).  
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tionality, the governmental entity bears the burden of presenting a 
“strong basis in evidence” of past or present discrimination to justify 
the remedial program.19 In a 2003 Concrete Works opinion, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that Denver’s ordinances 
codifying its minority and women set-aside program for public works 
contracting was unconstitutional.20 ` 
 It was in a 1994 Concrete Works appeal from summary judgment 
that the Tenth Circuit first held that a “strong basis in evidence” 
finding was a conclusion of law to be reviewed de novo, reversing and 
remanding the trial court decision.21 On remand, the district court 
conducted a bench trial, concluding that Denver had failed to prove 
the existence of past or present discrimination which would justify 
the program.22 On appeal, because it had earlier directed that 
whether a “strong basis in evidence” had been shown was a question 
of law, the Tenth Circuit engaged in plenary review and reversed the 
trial court’s ruling.  
 Justice Scalia, who has made no secret of his skepticism towards 
such programs,23 raised a standard of review conflict in urging a re-
versal of the Tenth Circuit.24 In his dissent from denial of certiorari, 
Justice Scalia urged the Court to 
resolve this significant and unsettled [standard of review] 
question. Any doubts about the question’s practical impor-
tance dissolve when one considers the manner in which the 
Tenth Circuit’s application of de novo review in this case 
permitted it to rule as it did notwithstanding the factual de-
terminations made by the District Court after trial.25
 19. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996) (“[T]he institution that makes the ra-
cial distinction must have had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that remedial action 
was necessary, ‘before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.’ ”); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (city must “demonstrate a strong basis in evi-
dence” that remedial action was necessary); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S 267, 
277 (1986) (“In such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination that the em-
ployer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”).  
 20. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 
2003).
 21. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1522 
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1004 (1995). 
 22. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 956, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 23. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 520 (“The benign purpose of compensating 
for social disadvantages, whether they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimina-
tion or otherwise, can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimina-
tion than can other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected.”) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1985) (“In my 
view, government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of 
race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.”) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 24. Concrete Works, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 1034. 
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Justice Scalia’s position was that the court of appeals was bound to 
review the district court’s finding for clear error, which would have 
upheld the trial court’s finding of unconstitutionality.  
 Despite his having several prior opportunities to correct the stan-
dard of review, his 2003 opinion marked the first time Justice Scalia 
had taken issue with the standard of review relating to a “strong ba-
sis in evidence” determination. This was the second time that the 
Concrete Works litigation found its way to the Supreme Court. In the 
Concrete Works 1994 iteration, where the court of appeals first held 
that a “strong basis in evidence” determination was to be reviewed de
novo, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, with no objection to the 
standard by Justice Scalia.26 In 1997, a circuit split as to the correct 
standard of review became apparent in challenges to Miami-Dade 
County27 and Philadelphia28 minority set-aside programs. Supreme 
Court certiorari was denied in both challenges; in neither case did 
Justice Scalia opine upon the correct standard of review.29 In both 
cases, the appellate courts upheld the trial court rulings against the 
minority set-aside programs at issue. Justice Scalia’s latent clear er-
ror argument in Concrete Works thus begs the question: is his appli-
cation of Rule 52(a) warranted by its terms or does he believe appel-
late courts must give the highest deference to a trial court’s “strong 
basis in evidence” determination only when a trial court strikes down
a minority set-aside program? 
B.   Avoiding Rule 52(a)’s Applicability to Overrule the Trial Court’s 
Decision?
Appellate courts have failed increasingly to accord to the trial 
court’s findings of fact the respect and deference envisioned by the 
Clearly Erroneous Rule. 
–Honorable John F. Nangle30
Easley v. Cromartie31 illustrates how the Supreme Court itself cir-
cumvents Rule 52(a) for less-than-principled reasons. Easley was the 
legislative redistricting case involving the infamous North Carolina 
12th Congressional District, whose proposed configuration was 160 
 26. See City & County of Denver, Co. v. Concrete Works of Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 1004 
(1995).
 27. Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 
1997).
 28. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (1st Cir. 
1996).
 29. , 523 U.S. 1004 (1998); 
, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997). 
Metro. Dade County v. Eng’g Contractors Ass’n City of 
Philadelphia v. Contractors Ass’n
 30. Nangle, supra note 13, at 410. 
 31. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
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miles long, and much of it no wider than Interstate 95.32 The sub-
stantive issue was the extent to which voting patterns of African 
Americans could be used to draw district boundaries. The district 
court found that the North Carolina Legislature had improperly used 
race, not politics, as a predominant consideration when it redesigned 
the 12th Congressional District, violating the Equal Protection 
Clause. Justice Breyer, writing for a 5-4 majority,33 acknowledged 
that clear error was the proper standard of review, as the “ultimate 
finding”34 of race as a predominant motivating factor was an eviden-
tiary one.35 That standard, he recognized, would entail a high degree 
of deference to the trial court determination, as well as to legislative 
decision making. Nonetheless, the majority decided to operate under 
a more searching standard, an “extensive review . . . for clear error.”36
 The majority defended this “clear error plus” standard of review 
on the grounds that the district court’s conclusion that the General 
Assembly used facially race-driven criteria to redraw the districts 
without any compelling justification was a “constitutionally critical” 
one.37 The majority also felt extensive review was appropriate be-
cause the trial below was “not lengthy,” there had been no interme-
diate appellate review, and the “key evidence consisted primarily of 
documents and expert testimony.”38 After engaging in an “extensive” 
analysis of the district court’s factual findings for clear error, the ma-
jority held that the legislature had not improperly considered race in 
its redistricting plan and overturned the district court’s decision.39
 In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote at length about the 
majority’s “foray into the minutiae of the record.”40 Citing earlier Su-
preme Court decisions, he asserted that the majority’s “extensive re-
view for clear error” standard had neither precedent nor support in 
precedent.41 In the dissent’s view, the race question in Easley regard-
ing motive (that is, to what extent did the legislators consider the ra-
cial makeup of the constituents when drawing the congressional dis-
trict?) should have been a purely fact-based inquiry.42  His concluding 
 32. The Supreme Court was well acquainted with the Easley controversy. Legal chal-
lenge to that redistricting scheme was initiated in 1992 as Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 
(E.D.N.C. 1992), and it reached the Supreme Court for full review four times in ten years: 
 (Shaw I);  (Shaw II); 
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); and Easley, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)
 33. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens. 
 34. Easley, 532 U.S. at 241. 
 35. Id.
 36. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 240. 
 38. Id. at 243. 
 39. Id. at 258. 
 40. Id. at 262. 
 41. Id. at 259. 
 42. Id.
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statement summed up his objection: “If I were the District Court, I 
might have reached the same conclusion that the Court does . . . . 
But I am not the trier of fact, and it is not my role to weigh evidence 
in the first instance.”43 The Court, in the dissent’s judgment, was 
therefore obligated to review the district court’s factual findings for 
clear error, regardless of the length of the trial, regardless of the ab-
sence of intermediate review, regardless of the form of the evidence.44
C.   Circumventing Rule 52(a) Through Fact Typology? 
Presumably, if the court feels that a trial judge’s determination 
should be reversed, it will classify it as a legal conclusion, thereby 
making reversal easier. 
—Stephen A. Weiner45
Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati46 demonstrates how a 
district court’s factual findings are vulnerable to fact typology and 
plenary review. Equality Foundation also illustrates how the undis-
ciplined application of fact typology foreshadows an ideologically 
tinged opinion. In 1993, Cincinnati voters approved Article XII of the 
City Charter by a 62-38% margin.47 The Amendment, popularly re-
ferred to as Issue 3, directed that neither Cincinnati nor its subenti-
ties could “enact, adopt, enforce, or administer any ordinance, regula-
tion, rule or policy” which would permit “homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation status, conduct, or relationship” to be a basis for 
anyone to claim a “minority or protected status, quota preference or 
other preferential treatment.”48 The proponent of the Amendment 
 43. Id. at 267. 
 44. Id. at 259 (“We are not permitted to reverse the court’s finding ‘simply because 
[we are] convinced that [we] would have decided the case differently.’ ” (citing Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 
 45. Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL.
L. REV. 1020, 1022 (1967). 
 46. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 47. Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d,
54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 48. The Amendment read as follows:  
ARTICLE XII NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED 
UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS. The City 
of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, 
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides 
that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relation-
ship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have 
any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other preferen-
ial treatment. t
This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any 
ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted 
that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or 
effect.
Id. at 422. 
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was Equal Rights Not Special Rights, a political action group part of 
a then-national network of similar organizations.49
 Less than one week after Issue 3’s passage, Equality Foundation 
of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., and other plaintiffs filed a motion for pre-
liminary injunction in federal district court, challenging its constitu-
tionality on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.50 The court 
ordered a preliminary injunction, staying its implementation pend-
ing a full hearing on the merits.51 Seven months later, after a bench 
trial, Judge Spiegel issued a permanent injunction.52
 In finding Issue 3 unconstitutional, the judge relied on live and 
documentary expert testimony of citizens, psychologists, historians, 
municipal law and civil rights experts, and political scientists.53 The 
district court made clear that 
[i]n weighing the testimony of the witnesses, we considered each 
witness’ relationship to the Plaintiff or to the Defendant; their in-
terest, if any, in the outcome of the trial; their manner of testify-
ing, particularly where they testified in Court; their opportunity to 
observe or acquire knowledge concerning facts about which they 
testified; and the extent to which they were supported or contra-
dicted by other credible evidence.54
 In particular, with regard to the experts, the court found them “on 
the whole” to be “extremely knowledgeable, well-prepared and credi-
ble.”55 From that testimony and the “massive amount of evidence”56
admitted into the record, the district court encapsulated its evidentiary 
conclusions into twenty-three findings of fact. Judge Spiegel concluded 
that Issue 3 violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights as a 
quasi-suspect class and their fundamental rights to association freedom 
and government petition under the First Amendment.57
 In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit did not 
waste its first breath: “most, if not all” of the district court’s findings 
were “findings of ‘ultimate’ facts which entail the application of law, 
or constitute sociological judgments which transcend ordinary factual 
 Incidentally, the intent of the Amendment is clear from the use of the phrase “other pref-
erential treatment.” The Amendment was drafted by Equal Rights Not Special Rights and 
evinces a purpose to equate “minority,” “quota,” and “protected status” with the pejorative 
phrase “preferential treatment.” This rhetoric is legion in the modern anti-civil-rights 
movement. 
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 423. 
 52. Id. at 449. 
 53. See id. at 424. 
 54. Id. at 420. 
 55. Id. at 424. 
 56. Id. at 426-27. 
 57. Id. at 449-50. 
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determinations,” constitutional facts, or mixed questions of law and 
fact.58 With that, the Sixth Circuit was able to engage in plenary re-
view and mine the assumptions underlying each and every evidentiary 
finding. After announcing plenary review, the Sixth Circuit launched 
into its opinion, whose text adopted much of the most inflammatory 
rhetoric of the Equal Rights Not Special Rights campaign.59
D.   Summary 
Concrete Works, Easley, and Equality Foundation alternatively 
raised instances in which Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard was 
urged, rejected, or circumvented altogether in favor of fact typology. 
Importantly, each case also involved salient issues of broad social 
consequence. The question then arises whether each case repre-
sented a legitimate approach to Rule 52(a) or: 
1. In Concrete Works, did Justice Scalia urge clear error review 
because the district court’s opinion about Denver’s set-aside 
program was consonant with his opposition to such programs?  
2. Did the Easley majority avoid clear error review as a way to en-
force its assumptions about African-American voting habits?  
3. Did the Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation circumvent the 
clear error standard because of an ideological hostility towards 
gay and lesbian rights? 
 Answering those questions requires a review of Rule 52(a)’s his-
tory and how its text facilitates circumvention of its own terms. Re-
sponding to those questions also requires investigation into how ap-
pellate courts classify facts so to engage in de novo scrutiny of a trial 
court’s factual findings and how courts’ inconsistent approaches to 
selecting and articulating the chosen standard of review can mask 
ideological bias.  
III.   RULE 52—HISTORY
A.   The Appellate System 1789-1803 
 A look at Rule 52(a)’s emergence reveals that the attempt to strike 
the proper balance between trial court deference and de novo appel-
late review is not new. The effort began at the time of this country’s 
founding, when the Constitution’s framers were attempting to create 
a unified system of appellate review between actions at law and eq-
uity. At that time, actions at law were reviewable only as to whether 
legal error had been committed in the lower court. Actions in equity, 
 58. Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F. 3d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 59. See infra, at Part VII.C. 
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in which the evidence taken was in the form of documents and depo-
sitions, were retried de novo.60
 Review at law or equity could be triggered by two mechanisms: by 
writ of error or by appeal. Review by appeal—practiced by courts in 
equity and carried over into the colonies from chancery courts—
involved reexamination of both facts and law and even allowed for 
testimony or other evidence to be taken.61 Actions reviewed by writ 
applied only to actions at law, with a bill of exceptions submitted, 
and facts found were conclusive. Similarly, jury verdicts were re-
versible only if the law was wrongly applied or if the jury was 
wrongly instructed on the law.62 With Article III, Section 2(2) of the 
Constitution63 conferring federal appellate jurisdiction over both “law 
and fact” to the Supreme Court, a debate emerged about the federal 
judiciary’s power to direct the form and scope of review, as well as 
trial processes.
 More specifically, some saw the Supreme Court Article III powers 
as a threat to the proposed Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury. Those critical of the Article III powers feared they encroached 
upon the province of citizens of the states who, sitting as jurors, 
would have their decisions second-guessed. State judges also viewed 
the provisions as an affront to their integrity, while diminishing their 
authority, and sanctioning the Supreme Court’s potential exercise of 
arbitrary power.64 Those such as Alexander Hamilton saw the need 
to reconcile Article III with state practices—fearing the concerns 
could actually hinder the Constitution’s ratification.65 Ultimately, a 
 60. For general history, see Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of Find-
ings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 192 (1937); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930) 
(“From the moment that the appellate courts became a separate organization from the trial 
courts, a silent and probably unconscious struggle for supremacy began . . . .”); see also
Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appel-
late Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 647-49 (1988); Kunsch, supra note 2, at 15-18; 
Nangle, supra note 13, at 411-13; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact 
Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 508-16 (1963).    
 61. Kunsch, supra note 2, at 16; Note, supra note 60, at 511.
 62. Nangle, supra note 13, at 411-12; Note, supra note 60, at 508-09 n.12. Review of 
jury verdicts was only by writ of error and not overturned unless there was no substantial 
evidence to support the finding. Nangle, supra note 13, at 411. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court 
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and un-
der such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”). 
 64. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 192-94; Note, supra note 60, at 508.  
 65. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 192 (“So great was the fear of any semblance of 
arbitrary power in the hands of the central government that men turned to the jury as the 
very symbol of their freedom from automatic power.”).  
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balance was struck whereby the Supreme Court’s Article III powers 
were revised and the Seventh Amendment adopted.66
 Despite the resolution of the jury issue, there remained a debate 
as to how, upon review, appellate courts would examine judgments or 
decrees under the dual systems of law and equity. At that time, even 
though review of cases in equity was de novo, factual findings carried 
a presumption of correctness, where trial court findings were upheld 
unless they were clearly against the weight of the evidence or prem-
ised upon an erroneous view of the law.67 The presumption of cor-
rectness, however, depended upon the form of evidence proffered. 
Findings based on oral testimony were afforded greater deference, 
the rationale being that the trial judge was in the best position to 
consider issues of witness credibility. Findings based on documentary 
or undisputed evidence were given less deference, as such evidence 
gave the trial judge no observational advantages.68
 The First Judiciary Act of 1789 unified the dual systems by allow-
ing for review only through writ of error.69 Relevantly, the Act al-
lowed Supreme Court review of judgments rendered in civil actions, 
circuit court equity cases, cases removed to circuit courts from the 
States, or by appeal from district court where liability of greater than 
two thousand dollars had been adjudged.70 The Act also directed that 
courts in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdictions adopt oral 
testimony and witness examination in open court as a mode of proof, 
as was the practice in actions at law.71 This latter provision was met 
with objections of advocates of the chancery procedure, as it forced 
chancellors to adapt their practice of trying cases to civil principles. 
Similarly, admiralty lawyers were concerned with the time and effort 
needed to adjust to this new practice, especially in light of the in-
creasing number of court decisions arising out of maritime legal con-
flicts between the United States and other sovereigns.72
 66. Id. at 193. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in 
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where 
the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the 
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”). 
 67. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 193-94.   
 68. Nangle, supra note 13, at 412-13.  
 69. Note, supra note 60, at 509. 
 70. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 193. If it reversed the lower court’s decision, the 
Supreme Court could enter another ruling or pass a decree the lower court should have. Id.
But if the reversal favored the plaintiff, the decree was uncertain, or damages were as-
sessed, the Court was directed to remand. Id. The Supreme Court would not execute, but 
direct that a lower court do so. Id. at 194.
 71. In courts of equity, admiralty, and maritime, evidence was taken by deposition. 
Id. at 195.
 72. Id. at 194. 
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 A seminal interpretation of the 1789 Act led to a substantial 
change in practice. In Wiscart v. D’auchy,73 Chief Justice Ellsworth’s 
majority opinion holding that the statement of facts found by the cir-
cuit court was conclusive evoked a firestorm of controversy.74 Justice 
Ellsworth’s affirmation of the Act’s writ of error processes prompted 
Congress to effectively recreate dual systems of review.75 In 1802, it 
enacted a provision whereby either party to an equity action could 
request, and the court in its discretion might order, testimony to be 
taken by deposition.76 A year later, Congress abolished writs of er-
ror in equity, maritime, and admiralty in favor of review by ap-
peal. Up to 1865, two parallel systems of review continued, with 
no meaningful attempts to create a unified system of review for 
cases at law and equity.77
B.   The Appellate System 1865-1935 
 It was about 1865 when two trends came to a head which would 
compel a restructuring of appellate review. The development of code 
pleading throughout the states unifying actions in law and equity 
hastened the decline of the distinction.78 State codes, in merging the 
two forms of actions, also directed trial judges to make findings of 
fact to aid in review.79 In addition, with the country’s growth, federal 
courts began to feel burdened by the number and complexity of cases 
coming before them.80 In 1875, the Supreme Court would eventually 
raise the amount in controversy needed to confer jurisdiction and 
limit review of admiralty cases to questions of law.81
 With the Act of March 3, 1865,82 Congress codified a provision 
which would allow for waiver of jury trials in civil actions.83 Civil tri-
als had been designated as actions at law requiring appeal by writ of 
error.84 The Act provided that trial court rulings—if objected to at the 
time of trial and presented in a bill of exceptions—could be reviewed 
 73. 3 U.S. 320, 327 (1796); see Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 195. 
 74. Perhaps indicative of how jurisprudential themes abide, Justice Ellsworth in Wis-
cart wrote: “ ‘But surely it cannot be deemed a denial of justice that a man shall not be 
permitted to try his case two or three times over.’ ” Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 195 
(quoting Wiscart, 3 U.S. at 329). 
 75. Id. at 197. 
 76. Id. at 196. 
 77. Id. at 197. 
 78. Id. at 201. 
 79. At that time, states did not uniformly require findings of fact, which caused con-
siderable debate and confusion as to code pleading effectiveness. Walter Wheeler Cook, 
‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact,’ 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1936); Gunnar H. Nordbye, Im-
provements in Statement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 F.R.D. 25 (1941). 
 80. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 199. 
 81. Id. at 201-02. 
 82. Id. at 197; Act of March 3, 1865, § 4, c. 86, 13 Stat. 501. 
 83. § 4, c. 86, 13 Stat. 501. 
 84. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 198. 
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either upon writ of error or appeal.85 As a consequence, de novo ap-
pellate review was sharply curtailed.  
 This process prevailed until 1912, when Congress passed the Fed-
eral Equity Act.86 That Act allowed for the transfer of equity cases to 
courts at law. Moreover, Equity Act Rule 46 effectively restored the 
practice exercised following the 1789 Act by requiring that testimony 
be taken in open court and that judges pass on evidence admissibility 
as with actions at law.87 The 1912 Act was followed by the Law and 
Equity Act of 1915, which allowed for the transfer of cases at law into 
courts of equity and the filing of equitable defenses in actions at 
law.88 The passage of Equity Rule 70 1/2 in 1930 required a court to 
state facts specifically and separately state its conclusions of law, 
treating facts found as conclusive. Up to that point, despite free re-
view, appellate courts reviewing cases in equity had developed the 
practice of not disturbing a trial court’s factual findings unless they 
were “clearly wrong.”89 However, Rule 70 1/2 made that practice ex-
plicit and further undercut the rationale for “absolute” plenary re-
view.90 It was out of Equity Rule 70 1/2 that Rule 52 emerged and a 
uniform system of appellate review established.   
 Adopted in 1935, Rule 52(a) had the purpose of extending the pre-
vailing equity practice applicable in all nonjury cases to actions in 
law. Since its enactment, Rule 52 has been amended several times. 
Relevantly, in 1946, it was changed to more clearly require that find-
ings of fact be made.91 In 1983, where the Rule was formally silent, it 
explicitly allowed district judges to make findings of fact orally. Fi-
nally, in 1985, Rule 52(a) was amended to clarify that it applied to all
findings of fact “whether based on oral or documentary evidence.”92
C.   Summary 
 Out of the history of Rule 52(a)’s emergence, three themes become 
apparent: (1) reviewing courts possess the final authority to review 
law for error, misapplication, and declaration, while trial courts en-
gage in fact finding; (2) judicial comity and resources are maximized 
through effective allocation of decision making responsibilities; and 
(3) modes by which trial evidence is taken and factual findings are 
 85. Id. However, if the judge’s finding was a special verdict, the reviewing court was 
limited to determining the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment. Id.
 86. Id. at 203.
 87. Id.; Note, supra note 60, at 510. 
 88. Clark & Stone, supra note 60, at 203.  
 89. Note, supra note 60, at 510-11 (and cases cited therein). 
 90. Id. at 511. 
 91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note on 1946 amendments.  
 92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note on 1985 amendments.  
2007]                          IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON? 1043 
                                                                                                                   
documented seek to maximize judicial efficiencies between the trial 
and appellate courts.  
 Rule 52(a) attempts to codify those themes. The Rule seeks to al-
locate power and responsibilities between the trial and appellate 
courts and enhance systemic efficiencies. Trial courts are given au-
thority over findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence. Appellate courts are empowered to independently review 
law as declared or applied, but must let stand findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.
 However, Rule 52(a) has not been able to completely prevent ap-
pellate courts from crossing the lines of decision making responsibili-
ties and authority, thus tipping the balance of competence, comity, 
and efficiency. Concrete Works, Easley, and Equality Foundation
serve as a few examples of this. As we will see, Rule 52(a) text and 
court decisions reveal that (1) factual findings cannot always be ar-
ticulated with sufficient clarity to avert appellate court scrutiny, (2) 
appellate courts continue to avoid Rule 52(a)’s directive as it regards 
documentary evidence, (3) Rule 52(a)’s “clearly erroneous” standard 
is malleable, and (4) appellate court fact typology can render Rule 
52(a) inapplicable.  
IV.   THE ROLE OF COURTS—GENERALLY
A.   What Courts Do 
 To fairly consider the overarching Rule 52(a) themes, it is useful 
to first examine the Rule within the broad framework of what courts 
do, which is identify facts, declare law, and apply law. Fact identifi-
cation entails the collection and distillation of information needed to 
adjudicate within the legal framework of a case.93 That information 
may be derived from a variety of sources, although the litigants, the 
judge, and/or the jury act as agents, placing the information into the 
legal framework.94 Law declaration entails the creation and devel-
opment of legal norms. By their character, legal norms are estab-
lished not only to articulate the law in a given context, but to provide 
guidance for future litigants, the courts, and society to be governed 
by those norms.95
 93. Forrest G. Alogna, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinc-
tion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1154 (2001) (fact “determinations . . . are specific assess-
ments of what actually occurred”). 
 94. However, as we will see, the process of fact identification is never as easy as the 
term would suggest—due not only to epistemological dilemmas, but to evidentiary rules 
which cabin facts and the often less-than-precise articulation of “pure” findings of fact. 
 95. Alogna, supra note 93, at 1154 (“legal principles have general normative and pre-
scriptive significance”); Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction
Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 918 (1992) (legal norms “prescribe the con-
sequences to be attached to” facts). 
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 Law application entails “relating the legal standard of conduct to 
the facts established by the evidence.”96 In this “complex psychologi-
cal process,”97 legal norms are reinforced, rejected, clarified, or elabo-
rated upon over the situation-specific facts.98 Law application can 
give the legal norm added force through its application to a new fac-
tual context. Conversely, law application can dilute or nullify the le-
gal norm through a refusal to apply it. Law application can enhance 
the legal norm’s predictability through clarification and explication. 
Finally, law application can create an entirely new legal norm, 
through explicit declaration or by adding nuance through elaboration 
upon the existing legal norm.99
B.   Rule 52(a) as an Allocation of Responsibility Mechanism  
 Rule 52(a) is a mechanism by which the responsibility for fact 
identification, law declaration, and law application is allocated.100
While the act of law application is performed by both the trial and 
appellate courts, the premise behind giving the trial courts fact find-
ing authority and appellate courts authority over the law is a “de-
termination that . . . one judicial actor is in a better position to decide 
the issue in question.”101 In making these allocations, Rule 52(a) codi-
fies important values: judicial competence, administrative efficiency, 
and doctrinal coherence.102
 Trial courts take testimony and other evidence, render eviden-
tiary decisions, and make judgments about witness credibility in or-
der to develop factual findings. As the role of trial judge as fact finder 
becomes rooted, judges ideally adapt to and master the act of fact 
 96. Alogna, supra note 93, at 1155 (law application “entails a judgment that that this 
law is relevant to these facts, or stated conversely, that the facts, by meeting the standard 
instantiated in the law, trigger legal consequences”); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 236 (1985).  
 97. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 236. 
 98. Id.
 99. In the elaboration upon existing norms, new law can be made in intended and un-
intended ways. When the norm elaboration becomes more visible, courts enter the territory 
of law declaration. The distinction drawn between norm elaboration and law application 
attempts to parse holding versus dictum. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 264. However, sepa-
rating court holdings from dicta is not an easy proposition. George C. Christie, Judicial 
Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14 (1992). Christie criticizes Monaghan, who, 
he says, assumes that it is possible to distinguish clearly between norm elaboration and 
norm application, feeling that the assumption that such a distinction can be clearly drawn 
is “untenable on both theoretical and practical grounds . . . . [T]he distinction is certainly 
always one of degree and not one of discrete logical categories.” Id. at 31.
 100. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 234.  
 101. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985); see also Alogna, supra note 93, at 1157 
(quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); Cooper, supra note 60, at 659.  
 102. Bryan Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 629, 630 (2004); Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts,
41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 781 (1957).  
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finding.103 Moreover, given the structure of the court system which 
does not permit nor can sustain matters being fully relitigated at 
each level, having facts fully adjudicated at the trial level promotes 
efficiencies by relieving appellate courts of that often lengthy and ar-
duous task.104 Appellate judges, on the other hand, are not bound to 
try cases, but are expected to thoughtfully consider and apply the law 
with a greater degree of intellectual rigor. As apparent since the 
creation of appellate review, their role is to finally articulate the law 
and give doctrinal uniformity to legal norms.  
C.   Rule 52(a) as an Allocation of Power Mechanism 
 Directing that findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless . . .” 
suggests that Rule 52(a) was intended to fix the realm of authority 
trial courts would possess. That the drafters did not have Rule 52(a) 
read “shall [ ]  be set aside if . . .” reflects that they did not intend 
Rule 52 to articulate the reach of the appellate courts over the trial 
courts. Thus, Rule 52(a), by giving trial courts explicit authority 
over findings of fact, acts as an empowerment mechanism. In the 
process, Rule 52(a) lends a presumption of finality to the trial 
courts’ factual determinations.  
 Conversely, by not subjecting “conclusions of law” to Rule 52(a)’s 
clearly erroneous standard, the appellate courts’ role as final arbiter 
of “what the law is”105 is also reinforced. The clearest example occurs 
when a trial court errs by committing a mistake of law or has misap-
plied the law.106 Furthermore, at the juncture where a trial court ap-
plies the law in a manner that approaches norm declaration or norm 
elaboration,107 appellate courts’ power to engage in de novo review 
becomes explicit. Rule 52(a) implicitly empowers appellate courts to 
affirm the trial court judgments. Affirming trial court decisions fur-
thers jurisprudential values of comity and systemic legitimacy as 
well, reinforcing the correctness of those judgments and mitigating 
perceptions of unwarranted trial court bias. In turn, the legitimacy of 
the legal norms is enhanced.  
 103. Wright, supra note 102, at 782.   
 104. Thus, the controlling factor is the relative competence of the two tribunals and not 
promotion of trial court dignity and administrative efficiency.  
 105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Monaghan, supra note 96, at 264. 
 106. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986); Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives 
Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 
194 n.9 (1963); see also JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL, §
52.32. (3d ed. 1997).  
 107. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 236-37.  
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D.   Summary 
 Rule 52(a), as a mechanism for allocating responsibility and power 
between the courts, serves important functions. Giving legal norms 
consistency, enhancing systemic efficiencies, and promoting judicial 
competence are the goals Rule 52(a) strives to enforce. However, Rule 
52(a), by its terms, enables appellate courts to cross the lines of re-
sponsibility and authority. Rule 52(a)’s operative words—“findings of 
fact,” “documentary evidence,” and “clearly erroneous”—are so mal-
leable that appellate courts freely depart from their plainest mean-
ing. What is more, appellate courts are aided in Rule 52(a) circum-
vention by their power to classify or reclassify facts.  
V.   THE MALLEABLE NATURE OF RULE 52(A)
A.   No.1: Articulating Findings of Fact 
 Established in equity practice and incorporated into Rule 52(a), 
trial courts are required to articulate findings of fact for appellate re-
view.108 The requirement that findings of fact be placed on the record 
serves three purposes: (1) to assist the appellate court by giving it a 
clear understanding of the ground or basis of the decision of the trial 
court,109 (2) to make definite precisely what is being decided by the 
case in order to apply the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata in fu-
ture cases, and (3) to evoke care on the part of the trial judge in as-
certaining the facts.110 As for their value as precedent, findings of 
fact serve a vital role. “Findings of fact aid in the process of judgment 
and in defining for future cases the precise limitations of the issues 
and the determination thereon.”111 The two challenges inherent in 
Rule 52(a) aspiring to that role are (1) defining and articulating 
“facts” and (2) distinguishing “facts” from “law.”  
1.   Defining and Articulating “Facts” 
 Defining what is a “fact” has eluded epistemologists and philoso-
phers alike, to say nothing of jurists. The most commonly understood 
definition of a fact is something that has actual existence, an objec-
tive reality.112 Gary Lawson defines the concept of truth as “a reality 
that exists independently of its acknowledgement by the conscious 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).  
 109. MOORE, supra note 106, at § 52-03(2) (to require findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to be stated “is to furnish the causal link between the facts and the judgment rendered”).  
 110. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR B. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL SECTION, §§ 2571, 2579 (1971). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note on 1946 amendments. 
 112. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DESK DICTIONARY 175 (2005). 
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mind of a perceiver.”113 Even the most objective facts, however, are 
modified by the perceiver and the context in which they are per-
ceived.114 Participants in the legal process account or recount acts, 
events, or conditions which have occurred, which currently exist, or 
even which might occur.115 More than this, inferences and deductions 
drawn from those acts, events, or conditions are couched as facts. In 
making a statement of fact about a given situation, participants (or 
observers) account certain aspects, neglect others, and interpret the 
selected data.116 Facts—regardless of who articulates them—are em-
bedded with subjective value, reason, and belief. Thus, it is “imprac-
ticable, if not impossible, to make a pure fact statement.”117
2.   Distinguishing “Facts” from “Law” 
 In the adversarial system, the legal context itself determines 
which facts are articulated: those perceived to be relevant to respond-
ing to the legal issues raised or those needed to respond to the proc-
ess. To identify “relevant” facts, then, is to imbue them with legal 
value.118 As a result, the distinction between “law” and “fact” is not 
always an easy one to make.119 Nonetheless, the role of the trial 
 113. Gary Lawson, Legal Theory: Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 866 (1992); 
see also Cook, supra note 79, at 234 (“Facts are coercive—they exist whether or not we will 
them to.”); Monaghan, supra note 96, at 239 (“All facts are not ‘the direct result of observa-
tion, unmodified by any act of reason.’ ”). 
 114. Physicist Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle notes how the act of observa-
tion requires intervention into a system; yet we can never know whether the intervention 
into a system necessarily alters it. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE 
REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47-48 (1958). 
 115. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 235; Weiner, supra note 45, at 1022.  
 116. Cook, supra note 79, at 239 (facts “are not ‘the direct result of observation, un-
modified by any act of reason’ ”). 
 117. Cook, supra note 79, at 238 (“To make a ‘statement’ about such facts suggests we 
can do so. It is a scientific and philosophical impossibility.”). 
 118. Even terms that purport to state facts have legal dimensions.  For example, to say 
in a complaint that the “defendant had in his possession ten barrels of flour” is to couch 
fact as legal conclusion. See id. at 243.
 119. Alogna, supra note 93, at 1153 (noting the “ ‘elusive’ character of a technique for 
distinguishing fact from law”); Lawson, supra note 113, at 863 (“The law-fact distinction, 
whatever its utility, is purely a creature of convention.”); see also, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 408 (2000) (“[I]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish a mixed question of law 
and fact from a question of fact.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 
U.S. 99, 110-11 (1995) (“[T]he proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is 
sometimes slippery.”); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (“The 
Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues.”); 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (“[T]he appropriate methodology for distinguish-
ing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive.”); Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985) (“It will not always be easy to separate questions 
of ‘fact’ from ‘mixed questions of law and fact’ . . . .”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 
273, 288 (1982) (citing the “vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and 
questions of law” and the lack of a “rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a fac-
tual finding from a legal conclusion”); Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1943) 
(“[T]he chief difficulty in consistent and uniform compliance with the congressional limita-
1048 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1025 
                                                                                                                   
judge is to do just that, to discern “that part of reality which is rele-
vant to the adjudication of the action.”120 Moreover, “constructing a 
finding of fact requires a judge to do more than simply identify and 
describe a ‘reality’; it requires the judge to interpret, choose between, 
make inferences from, deduce toward, and/or synthesize data, then 
articulate one or more ‘relevant realities.’ ”121 As Professor Henry 
Monaghan has observed, in constructing findings of fact, a judge 
must be able to “yield only assertions that can be made without sig-
nificantly implicating the governing legal principles.”122 Monaghan’s 
use of the qualifier “significantly” concedes the impossibility of 
wholly divorcing facts from their legal context. Consequently, judges 
are challenged to make factual findings which, to the extent practi-
cable, are devoid of legal terms, concepts, or norms.123
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty in distin-
guishing between law and fact, but it has failed to develop a “rule or 
principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a le-
gal conclusion.”124 Doubtlessly, the root of the difficulty is in the “vex-
ing nature” of the distinction.125 What can best be said is that the 
law/fact distinction is only one of degree, with “pure” law at one end 
of the continuum126 and “pure” fact at the other end. In this way, it is 
said that “law and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest 
and relative stability on a continuum of experience.”127 It is the point 
at which a factual finding “crosses the line between application of [ ] 
ordinary principles of logic and common experience . . . into the 
realm of a legal rule” when Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard yields to 
de novo review.128 It is precisely this “nodal quality” of the law/fact 
distinction that provides the leeway for appellate courts—
tion upon court review lies in the want of a certain standard for distinguishing ‘questions 
of law’ from ‘questions of fact.’ . . . [I]ts difficulties in practice are well known and have 
been subject of frequent comment.”). 
 120. Friedman, supra note 95, at 918.  
 121. Adamson, supra note 102, at 631 (citing Emmet T. Flood, Fact Construction and 
Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication, 100 YALE L.J. 1795, 1808-13 (1991) (emphasis 
added)); Lawson, supra note 113, at 863. 
 122. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 235. 
 123. Nordbye, supra note 79, at 28 (“Findings of fact, as a basic matter, should not con-
tain a mere recitation of the evidence, nor matters of argument or explanation.”). Nordbye 
asserts that opinion or memoranda do not constitute findings of fact. While valuable in of-
fering a judge’s view or rationale, opinion or memoranda do not state findings of fact 
strictly speaking, and thus the appellate court has the onus to “glean findings of issuable 
facts.” Id. at 32.   
 124. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.  
 125. Id.
 126. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 233. 
 127. Id. So even a “pure” fact is not so, because every fact exists within a context, sur-
rounded by other “facts” and, importantly, propelled by inferences which move it down the 
continuum. See id. at 232-36; Alogna, supra note 93, at 1155 (“[T]he nodes of law and fact 
are not necessarily distinct; they may blur together.”).  
 128. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984). 
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intentionally or unintentionally—to adhere to Rule 52(a) or avoid 
it altogether. 
B.   No. 2: The Documentary Evidence “Mandate” 
 Rule 52(a)’s 1985 amendment was intended to explicitly resolve 
any question as to the form of evidence which must be reviewed for 
“clear error.” Since then, appellate courts have been bound to give 
the appropriate deference to a trial court’s factual findings “whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence.”129 Despite the amendment, 
several appellate courts have elected to review documentary evidence 
de novo or upon some heightened standard other than clear error. 
1.   Treatment of “Traditional” Documents 
 Appellate court standard of review varies wildly in cases in which 
the trial record is solely or predominantly made up of documentary 
evidence. Some appellate courts have maintained that when a trial 
court’s factual findings do not rest on demeanor evidence and evalua-
tion of a witness’ credibility, heightened review is permissible.130
More specifically, while some courts engage in de novo review when 
the trial record consists of undisputed documents, others will an-
nounce plenary review even under circumstances in which docu-
ments are in contradiction.131 The underlying rationale behind both 
approaches is that the appellate court is in an equally competent po-
sition as the trial court in making evidentiary proof determinations 
and resolving disputes in documents. Where document review calls 
for making factual inferences towards an “ultimate” legal conclusion, 
some appellate courts feel deference is unwarranted, as facts move 
farther down the continuum toward their province of law application 
and declaration.132
2.   ”Documents” and New Technology 
 The growth of trial court evidence and testimony through elec-
tronic preservation has been exponential. The traditional trial court 
record used to consist of a trial transcript in paper form, along with 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 130. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234-43 (2001); First Nat’l Bank v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 335, at *15 (10th Cir. 1998) (“This case was resolved 
by the district court on stipulated facts and documentary evidence so that we can review de 
novo whether those facts establish just cause or excuse.”); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World 
Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The appellate court, in 
reviewing the documentary evidence presented, is in as good a position as the district court 
to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction. Our review, therefore, is plenary.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1980).
 131. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 132. See supra Part II.C. 
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briefs and exhibits. However, for at least the past forty-five years, 
trial courts have used motion cameras to record proceedings and 
other media forms to capture the trial record. Technology such as 
digital recording, enhanced audio and video capacities, computer-
assisted transcription, index and search functions, electronic briefs, 
and hyperlinked legal resources have become increasingly available 
at the trial and appellate court level. These advancements have 
made the use of electronic media more efficient through preservation 
of trial proceedings, documentary evidence, depositions, and legal re-
sources on CD-ROMs.133 Today, as federal courts become electroni-
cally equipped,134 the use of multimedia forms for taking and pre-
serving evidence for appeal compels a reevaluation not only of the 
definition of “documentary evidence,”135 but also of what the appro-
priate standard of review should be.136
 A fundamental rationale behind Rule 52(a) ceding fact finding au-
thority to the lower court is that the trial judge has the best opportu-
nity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses’ live testimony at trial. 
Some argue that the force of that rationale is diminished, however, if 
trial proceedings (and other evidentiary documents) can be fully pre-
served for review.137 Effectively, new “[v]ideo technology refutes the 
rhetoric of necessity that has long been invoked to defend traditional 
standards of appellate court deference to trial court decision mak-
ing.”138 Appellate judges have equal access to the same trial data and 
can more efficiently review that data than in the past. As a result, 
 133. Several state court appellate procedure rules now allow video or digital tran-
scripts to constitute the record on appeal. See Briana E. Chua, Comment, Arizona’s Digital 
Record & Its Use on Appeal, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (2003) (discussing Arizona, Kentucky, 
Ohio, Vermont, Alabama, and Tennessee rules).  
 134. For example, over 25% of the 1366 federal district courtrooms in the United States 
have laptop wiring and/or some form of computer monitor displays for the jury. “Still more 
courtrooms have access to portable equipment . . . . 94% of districts have access to an evi-
dence camera and 66% to a digital projector and projection screen.” Frederic I. Lederer, 
Courtroom Technology: For Trial Lawyers, the Future Is Now, 19 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 
(Spring 2004). 
 135. Indeed, the rules of discovery have expanded the definition of “documents” to ac-
commodate the role technology has played in the making, storing, and retention of evi-
dence for purposes of disclosure and exchange. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (as amended 2006); 
see, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437 (D.N.J. 2002) (stating that 
Rule 26(f)(1) conferences should encompass discussions regarding whether parties possess 
discoverable information in electronic form and whether such information will be pro-
duced, as well as software, privilege, and costs concerns).  
 136. Frederic I. Lederer, The Effect of Courtroom Technologies on and in Appellate Pro-
ceedings and Courtrooms, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 252 (2000) (“In one sense the 
most sweeping change facing the appellate courts is the likely change in the record of trial 
from text to multi-media, a change that presents at least the possibility of affecting the 
standard of appellate review.”). 
 137. Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, The Decisionmaking Process: Thawing Out the 
“Cold Record”: Some Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Stan-
dards of Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 411 (2000). 
 138. Id. at 412. 
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“studying and assessing the demeanor of witnesses, lawyers, and ju-
rors are no longer the exclusive province of the trial court.”139 Given 
these technological efficiencies, some have gone so far as to suggest 
that de novo appellate review should be compelled where important 
constitutional rights are at issue.140 Rule 52(a)’s clear error directive 
as it regards documentary evidence, consequently, is potentially left 
open to broader circumvention.  
C.   No. 3: Defining and Applying “Clear Error” 
 The term “clearly erroneous,” codified by Rule 52(a) in a bow to 
equity practice, has proven to be the most fugitive of terms to define. 
As a legal fiction, the term has “no intrinsic meaning” and is “elastic, 
capacious, malleable, and above all variable.”141 In United States v. 
Aluminum Company of America,142 Justice Learned Hand recognized 
the difficulty in providing substance to the term: “[A]ll that can be 
profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate less 
to reverse the findings of a judge than that of an administrative tri-
bunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse if most reluctantly and 
only when well persuaded.”143 In the most widely accepted sense, the 
Supreme Court has said that clear error exists where “although there 
is evidence to support” a district court’s factual findings, the appel-
late court, “on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”144 As the term 
“clearly erroneous” is, “at best, a nebulous concept,”145 appellate 
courts’ attempts to give meaning to the term reveal not only its mal-
leable nature, but also something about a court’s view of its authority 
vis-à-vis the trial court.  
 When articulating its standard of review, an appellate court often 
signals not only the standard of review which will be applied but also 
the appellate court’s disposition towards the trial court’s conclusions 
 139. Id. at 413. 
 140. See id. at 420-22 (arguing that in death penalty cases and the jury selection 
process, videotape should be a rule, given the constitutional questions those cases and 
processes raise). 
 141. Cooper, supra note 60, at 645. 
 142. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 143. Id. at 433. 
 144. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
395 U.S. 100 (1969); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); United States v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949); Comment, Scope of Appellate Review Widened, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 784, 787 (1949-50) (opining that the use of the “ ‘definite and firm conviction’ test” in 
Gypsum did not signal an intent to extend the scope of factual review, but merely did “no 
more than suggest a means of approach to the nebulous problem of when a finding of fact 
is subject to reversal under Rule 52(a)”).  
 145. Comment, supra note 144, at 785. At least one commentator has argued that a 
clarifying definition of “clearly erroneous” is neither possible nor desirable. Cooper, supra
note 60, at 645. 
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of law. In some instances, appellate courts articulate their respect for 
the line 52(a) attempts to draw by identifying the limits of their au-
thority. Appellate courts have held that a trial court’s factual find-
ings are to enjoy a presumption of correctness.146 Courts have been 
cautioned not to “substitute their own impressions for those of the 
[trial] court,”147 not to overturn the trial court decision “because it 
would have decided the case differently,”148 nor “retry the facts.”149
Courts are not to set aside a judgment “because of some doubt about 
the quantum of evidence,”150 nor are they to make “independent find-
ings upon [the] evidence.”151 Along those lines, trial courts hearing 
civil matters without a jury will not be found to have committed clear 
error if conclusions are “plausible”152 or supported by a “preponder-
ance of substantial evidence,”153 “substantial, competent evidence,”154
or “substantial credible evidence.”155
 Conversely, appellate courts have articulated the clear error stan-
dard in ways which signal the reach of their authority. Thus, an ap-
pellate court might say a trial court decision can be overturned if it is 
“without adequate evidentiary support”156 or is “without substantial
support.”157 Factual findings may be clearly erroneous if they are 
“without sufficient evidence,”158 “not supported by substantial evi-
dence,”159 or if “reasonable men could not possibly make such a find-
ing.”160 Moreover, if the decision is “devoid of minimum support,”161
has “no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data,”162 is 
 146. See Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980);
J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Englert Eng’g Co., 438 F.2d 3, 5 (6th Cir. 1971); Lowden v. Han-
son, 134 F.2d 348, 355 (8th Cir. 1943).
 147. Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 1980).
 148. See, e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
 149. See, e.g., O’Guinn v. Dutton, 42 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1995); Koch v. Hutchinson, 814 
F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing White v. Conoco, 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir. 
1983)); Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 150. Webb v. Frisch, 111 F.2d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 1940).
 151. Panaview Door & Window Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 255 F.2d 920, 926 (9th 
Cir. 1958).
 152. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74). 
 153. Raiche v. Standard Oil Co., 137 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1943).
 154. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 164 F.2d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1947).
 155. United States v. Charleston County, S.C., 365 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 156. Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 157. See Cont’l Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 
687 (1940).
 158. See Brown v. Dade Christian Sch., Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 312 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1975).
 159. Kincade v. Mikles, 144 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1944). 
 160. Campbell v. Barsky, 265 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1959).
 161. Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (1972). 
 162. Id. at 1302 (An “[a]ppellate court [must] accept the ultimate factual determination 
of the factfinder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evi-
dentiary support displaying some hue of credibility; or (2) bears no rational relationship to 
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“contrary to the clear weight of the evidence,”163 or goes against “the 
truth and right of the case,”164 trial courts have committed clear error.  
Appellate courts have phrased their standard of review an-
nouncement in sometimes subtle but insightful ways. These articula-
tions of Rule 52(a) are not distinctions without difference. Despite the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to offer guidance, the flesh given to the defini-
tion of “clear error” can yield meaningful and inconsistent outcomes. 
D.   No. 4: Fact Typology 
 On its face, Rule 52(a) applies to any and all trial court findings of 
fact, no matter what type of fact.165 As the Supreme Court famously 
noted, Rule 52 “does not make exceptions or purport to exclude cer-
tain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of 
appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. 
It does not divide facts into categories . . . .”166 Nonetheless, appellate 
courts have effectively discarded that plain reading through the de-
velopment of a fact typology—a direct consequence of the “nodal” 
quality of the fact/law distinction: historical,167 ultimate, constitu-
the supportive evidentiary data. Unless the reviewing court establishes existence of either 
of these factors, it may not alter the facts found by the trial court.”).
 163. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1944); Fleming v. 
Palmer, 123 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 662 (1941).
 164. Sanders v. Leech, 158 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1946).
 165. See, e.g., Tex. Co. v. R. O’Brien & Co., 242 F.2d 526, 529 (1st Cir. 1957) (“Rule 
52(a) unambiguously governs all findings . . . .”); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1954) (absent such clear error as to leave court, on entire 
evidence, with definite and firm conviction that mistake had been committed with respect 
to findings of trial court, such findings are binding and apply also to factual inferences 
from undisputed facts; appellate court could not interfere with the finding of the trial court 
unless that finding was clearly erroneous when the facts were stipulated); Ball v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948) (even findings based upon stipulated or 
undisputed subsidiary facts); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s notes.   
 166. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (Rule 52 “does not make excep-
tions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a 
court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. It does not di-
vide facts into categories; in particular, it does not divide findings of fact into those that 
deal with ‘ultimate’ and those that deal with ‘subsidiary’ facts.”) (holding that whether a 
differential impact of the seniority system reflected an intent to discriminate on account of 
race is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52(a)’s clearly erroneous standard); accord
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (reiterating Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. 273).  
 167. In referencing “historical” facts throughout this Article, I am using the term to 
mean those facts giving rise to the case before a court. “Historical facts” are alternatively 
referred to as “pure” facts, “basic” facts, or “primary” facts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 
506 (1953). Such facts have also been referred to as “circumstantial” or “evidentiary” facts. 
Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S 34, 39 (1937). Most commonly, “historical” facts are synony-
mous with “adjudicative” facts. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 
(1958) (adjudicative facts are those that are specific to the litigation). Historical facts des-
ignate “what exists, in contrast with what should, rightfully, exist . . . things, events, ac-
tions, conditions, as happening, existing, really taking place.”); Ann Woolhandler, Rethink-
ing the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988) (adjudica-
tive facts “are the stuff of ordinary litigation”). 
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tional, legislative,168 and jurisdictional.169 Legislative facts them-
selves have been subcategorized into types: sociological, scientific, po-
litical, historical (as a branch of knowledge), economic, or law-
legislative. In carving out these “exceptional” types of facts, trial 
courts have been left with only findings of historical facts which are 
insulated by clear error (but as we will see, in many instances, even 
historical facts can be subject to de novo review). For all these other 
fact types, appellate courts have appropriated for themselves the dis-
cretion to exercise independent judgment over factual findings. To 
better appreciate the implications raised by these fact types and 
their treatment, the following Section will first focus on historical 
facts before examining those often collectively, imprecisely, referred 
to as “mixed questions of law and fact.”  
1.   Historical Facts
 Put plainly, historical facts answer the question “what happened 
here?”170 A historical fact is “the assertion that a phenomenon has 
happened or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to any 
assertion as to its legal effect.”171 In this sense, historical facts are 
value-neutral (at least in theory) when distinguished from conclu-
sions of law. “Determinations that a defendant in a negligence case 
failed to stop at a stop sign”172 or, in a criminal case, that a defendant 
had a gun are examples of adjudicative facts. Once the trier of fact 
determines these facts, her role is to then apply preexisting legal 
rules to those facts to reach a decision.  
 Historical facts, being the “purest” type of fact, should be those 
most clearly subject to Rule 52(a).173 However, appellate courts can 
 168. See Kurtis A. Kemper, What Constitutes “Adjudicative Facts” Within Meaning of 
Rule 201 of Federal Rules of Evidence Concerning Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts,
150 A.L.R. FED. 543, 553 (1998). 
 169. This Article will not fully examine jurisdictional facts. The jurisdictional fact doc-
trine concerns itself with the scope of power exercised in administrative agencies and 
whether, in light of an empowering statute, agencies have appropriately exercised that 
power. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between 
the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury 
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 995 n.13 (1986) (jurisdictional 
facts are those “fundamental to the existence of an agency’s statutory jurisdiction”); see 
also Arthur Larson, The Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 15 TEMP. L.Q. 185 (1941). 
Whether “objects, situations or acts” fall within the administrative agency’s decisional 
power is reviewable de novo. Id. If jurisdictional propriety is established, the next question 
is whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the administrative agency conclu-
sions. Id. at 187. 
 170. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 235. 
 171. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (abridged 
student ed. 1965).  
 172. Woolhandler, supra note 167, at 113-14.  
 173. The explanatory notes of Rule 52 state that the clearly erroneous provision was 
applicable to all classes of fact “whether the finding is of a fact concerning which there was 
2007]                          IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON? 1055 
                                                                                                                   
take historical facts out of the realm of clear error. Appellate courts 
have exercised independent judgment over historical facts when 
based on documentary evidence,174 undisputed testimonial evi-
dence,175 stipulated evidence, or inferences and deductions made 
from historical facts.176 As illuminated in the previous Section, appel-
late courts justify de novo review on the grounds that the form 
(documentary) and/or character (disputed/undisputed) of the evi-
dence, coupled with the absence of witness demeanor and credibility 
determinations, make appellate courts just as capable of fact find-
ing.177
2.   Mixed Statement of Law and Fact 
 Mixed statements of law and fact are those which have embedded 
not only “pure” factual elements, but also indicia of legal principles. 
The Supreme Court has defined mixed questions of law and fact as 
“questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, 
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts sat-
conflict of testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testimony.” See
Note, supra note 60, at 514 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note); see also
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960) (the clearly erroneous standard applies to 
factual inferences from undisputed facts); Rawl v. United States, 778 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 
1985); Karavos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Atlantica Export Corp., 588 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 
1978) (the “clearly erroneous” standard is to be applied only to findings of historical fact 
and the “inferences therefrom”); Stafos v. Jarvis, 477 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973) (describing the clearly erroneous standard as inapplicable to both 
questions of law and those of mixed law and fact).
 174. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Am. States Ins. Co., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 335, at 
*15 (10th Cir. 1998) (“This case was resolved by the district court on stipulated facts and 
documentary evidence so that we can review de novo.”).
 175. See, e.g., id.; Marrs-Winn Co. v. Giberson Elec., Inc., 103 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 
1996) (deciding to use primarily a de novo review standard “because most of the evidence 
was presented by stipulation, the testimony was essentially undisputed, and the bank-
ruptcy court’s decision rested solely on legal conclusions”). 
 176. See, e.g., Yorke v. Thomas Iseri Produce Co., 418 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1969)
(“[W]hen factual determination is primarily a matter of drawing inferences from undis-
puted facts or determining legal implications, appellate review is far broader than where 
disputed evidence and questions of credibility are involved.”); Soles v. Franzblau, 352 F.2d 
47, 50 (3d Cir. 1965) (holding that the rule that findings of fact may not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous was not relevant where the “ultimate findings of fact were predicated 
upon inferences drawn from evidence as to which there was no disagreement”); Mayo v. 
Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1961) (“Under Rule 52(a) . . . the 
trial judge’s findings of fact are conclusive unless clearly erroneous, but when the factual 
determination is primarily a matter of drawing inferences from undisputed facts or deter-
mining their legal implications, appellate review is far broader than where disputed evi-
dence and questions of credibility are involved.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Gudgel v. Comm’r, 273 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1959) (“[I]n many 
cases . . . the Court of Appeals is as well qualified as the District Judge, or the Tax Court, 
to draw inferences and conclusions from undisputed facts without subjecting them to the 
test of the ‘clearly erroneous’ rule.”).  
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isfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the 
rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”178
 Ultimate, constitutional, and legislative facts can be viewed as 
specific forms of mixed statements of law and fact. However, more of-
ten than not, appellate courts characterize trial court findings as 
“mixed questions of law and fact” without distinguishing the type of 
fact at issue. A significant reason for this failure is the skill and care 
(or lack thereof) exhibited by judges at both levels when articulating 
factual findings. Assuming the legitimacy of parsing Rule 52(a) facts 
into types, articulating the fact type is important, as it offers impor-
tant insight into the rationale for the appellate court’s standard of 
review as well as the degree of scrutiny the appellate court should 
give to the evidence.  
(a)   Ultimate Facts 
 A mixed statement of law and fact may be an “ultimate fact,” such 
that when fact is applied to a legal standard, it directly triggers a le-
gal consequence.179 When articulated, an ultimate fact “must be suffi-
cient in itself, without inference or comparisons, or balancing of tes-
timony, or weighing evidence, to justify the application of the legal 
principles which must determine the case.”180 Ultimate facts may in 
turn be those which trigger a constitutional determination, a legisla-
tive judgment, or a judgment that a statutory, regulatory, or common 
law rule was violated. An example of a mixed statement of law and 
fact involving a common law or statutory principle is a determination 
that the applicable standard of care was not exercised—an “ultimate” 
fact going to a finding of negligence. Depending on the nature of the 
legal norm triggered, appellate courts will apply a standard of review 
ranging from clear error to de novo.
 Courts have drawn further distinctions by separating ultimate 
facts from subsidiary facts for purposes of applying a particular 
standard of review. “Subsidiary facts” might best be described as 
 178. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).  
 179. Judge Weinstein, for example, sees the term as synonymous with “operative fact,” 
“material fact,” and “consequential fact.” JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 401.4 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed. 2001). 
 180. Burr v. Des Moines R.R. & Navigation Co., 68 U.S. 99, 102 (1863) (“The statement 
of facts on which this court will inquire, if there is or is not error in the application of the 
law to them, is a statement of the ultimate facts or propositions which the evidence is in-
tended to establish, and not the evidence on which those ultimate facts are supposed to 
rest. The statement must be sufficient in itself, without inferences or comparisons, or bal-
ancing of testimony, or weighing evidence, to justify the application of the legal principles 
which must determine the case.”); see also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286 n.16 (“a ‘fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action’ ”); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra 
note 179, at 401[03] n.1 (1982) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401).  
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those which serve as premises for the ultimate fact. To elaborate 
upon the recent example, the subsidiary facts in a negligence matter 
might be that (1) the plaintiff was stopped at a light, (2) the light was 
red, and (3) the defendant struck the plaintiff’s car. The underlying 
facts may also establish that the defendant was (4) in his car, (5) 
traveling at ten miles per hour, (6) looking down to adjust his car 
stereo, and (7) when the defendant looked up, he was twenty-five feet 
from the plaintiff’s vehicle. Those subsidiary facts might lead to the 
conclusion that the defendant “failed to exercise ordinary care.” On 
appeal, some appellate courts will not separate those subsidiary facts 
from the ultimate fact, concluding that all facts found—ultimate 
and subsidiary—should be reviewed only for clear error.181 Others 
have undertaken the task of separating the subsidiary facts from 
the ultimate fact, reviewing the former for clear error and the latter 
de novo.182
(b)   Constitutional Facts 
 A constitutional fact is precisely what the term implies—one “fun-
damental to the existence of a constitutional right.”183 Whether a fact 
is classified as a “constitutional” one depends on whether the fact, if 
established, demonstrates the presence or absence of a constitutional 
right or obligation.184 Conversely, a constitutional fact is one which 
does not turn upon questions of whether a statutory, common law, or 
regulatory power has been exceeded or proscribed.185 For example, a 
determination as to whether a journalist defamed a plaintiff with ac-
 181. E.g., Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287 (“[Rule 52(a)] does not divide findings of 
fact into those that deal with ‘ultimate’ and those that deal with ‘subsidiary’ facts.”); see
also Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 995 (6th Cir. 1984) (“In Pullman-Standard v. Swint
the Supreme Court made it clear that Rule 52(a) makes no distinction between so-called 
‘ultimate’ and ‘subsidiary’ facts. A reviewing court is bound by all findings of fact in a case 
heard by a district court without a jury, or with an advisory jury, unless they are clearly 
erroneous.”); Comm’r v. Spermacet Whaling & Shipping Co., 281 F.2d 646, 650 (6th Cir. 
1960) (“The fact that the ultimate finding is a conclusion drawn from undisputed or estab-
lished subsidiary facts does not change such a finding from one of fact to a conclusion of 
law. Being a finding of fact it is not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”); Charles L. 
Brieant, Findings by the Court, Judgment on Partial Findings, in 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 52.05[3] (Daniel R Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006). 
 182. See, e.g., Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 
1982) (“The government urges us to treat the question of whether a contract exists as a 
matter of fact, which we can set aside only upon finding that the district court’s determina-
tion was clearly erroneous. This proposition fails to recognize the difference between sub-
sidiary facts and ultimate facts . . . . In drawing conclusions from subsidiary facts the abil-
ity of the trial court to apply the law properly becomes more significant than its peculiar 
advantage in judging the weight of the evidence. Thus, it is logical for the reviewing court 
to treat ultimate facts as matters of law that it may determine independently.”).  
 183. Louis, supra note 169, at 995 n.13. 
 184. Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1434-35 (2001).  
 185. Christie, supra note 99, at 26; Larson, supra note 169, at 187. 
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tual malice involves an assessment of historical facts which answer 
the constitutional fact, such as whether the defendant may use the 
First Amendment to shield his conduct.186 The constitutional nature 
of the facts leading to the presence or absence of actual malice infers 
that the ultimate ruling has far-reaching implications—not only for 
the litigants, but as precedent taking its place in future constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, adjudication of constitutional 
facts is often the most public and even divisive determination a court 
will render.  
 The constitutional fact doctrine emerged out of jurisdictional fact 
doctrine in the 1920s with administrative agency decision cases in-
volving due process and takings issues.187 The constitutional fact 
doctrine gained force when it was first applied to a criminal case, 
Near v. Minnesota.188 It has since been extended explicitly to 
First Amendment cases, beginning with New York Times v. Sul-
livan,189 when the actual malice concept was first given constitu-
tional fact dimensions.190
 Since New York Times, the doctrine has been expanded in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, most recently with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, 
Inc.191 The decision fortified the New York Times rule by holding that 
the presence or absence of “actual malice” in libel cases was a consti-
tutional fact warranting de novo review.192 The Supreme Court has 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1989).
 187. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (discussing the scope of review of 
U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission’s findings of fact); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 
U.S. 276 (1922) (discussing the scope of review of Bureau of Immigration deportation deci-
sions under the Chinese Exclusion Act); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 
U.S. 287 (1920) (discussing the scope of judicial review of Public Service Commission of 
Pennsylvania’s decision regarding water company’s rates); Christie, supra note 99, at 20-
26; Larson, supra note 169, at 190-99. 
 188. 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also Monaghan, supra note 96, at 247-63. 
 189. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Monaghan, supra note 96, at 240-41. 
 190. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 238. 
 191. 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Monaghan, supra note 96, at 239-47. 
 192. 466 U.S. at 510-11 (applying the doctrine of constitutional fact to the trial court’s 
finding of actual malice). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected Rule 52(a)’s 
clearly erroneous standard of review, citing the importance of the actual malice principle to 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. In his opinion, Justice Stevens noted the obligation of 
appellate courts to “maintain control of, and clarify legal principles,” as well as their duty 
to “unify precedent.” Id. Though not explicitly doing so, Justice Steven’s opinion seems to 
require de novo review of every factual element underlying an actual malice finding. Some 
appellate courts have interpreted Bose as not requiring de novo review of the subsidiary 
facts going to the presence or absence of actual malice. See, e.g., Connaughton v. Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc., 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Note, Am-
plifying Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in 
Public Person Defamation Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1989) (referencing several 
cases in an “attempt to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the constitutional mandate of 
independent appellate review of an actual malice determination”). By not clearly answer-
ing the question of which factual elements of actual malice would be subject to independ-
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also invoked the constitutional fact doctrine when deciding contro-
versies involving the Commerce Clause, Due Process, and the Eighth 
Amendment, as well as the Fourth Amendment. In those cases, the 
Court engaged in de novo review of controversies presenting the is-
sue of whether a waterway was navigable;193 whether a fine, in its 
amount, constituted cruel and unusual punishment;194 and whether 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause existed prior to an interro-
gation.195  Despite the apparent historical fact-based nature of these 
inquiries, the Supreme Court ruled that because a response to those 
facts directly triggered constitutional rights or obligations, it would 
engage in de novo review.196
(c)   Legislative Facts 
 Legislative facts fall into three distinct categories: facts which 
govern the process by which a judge or jury decides cases, those 
which play an adjudicatory function within a settled legal context, 
and those which are used to make law.197 The first category of legis-
lative facts informs and guides the trier’s reasoning toward a particu-
ent review—the historical facts or the legal inferences made from those facts—the Bose de-
cision has given appellate courts permission to fully reweigh the facts underlying a district 
court’s finding on actual malice. For a discussion of the Bose case, see, for example, Mona-
ghan, supra note 96, at 239-47; Cathy Parker, Note, Can Civil Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-
Exist with Independent Review in Actual Malice Cases?—Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984), 60 WASH. L. REV. 503 (1985). 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), su-
perseded by statute as stated in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct 2208, 2216 (2006) (re-
garding the definition of “navigable waters of the United States”). 
 194. See e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
433-34 (2001). 
 195. See e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996). 
 196. For a more extensive discussion of the doctrine, see, for example, Hoffman, supra 
note 184; Larson, supra note 169; Monaghan, supra note 96; Rachael N. Pine, Speculation 
and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 655 (1988); Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 46 N.C.
L. REV. 223 (1968); Judah A. Shechter, Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1483 (1988).  
 197. See generally A.J. Stephani, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena: 
Judicial Notice and the Potential of the Legislative Fact Remand, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
509, 518-19 (2000) (discussing three types of legislative facts: “nonadjudicative facts that 
are used as part of the judicial reasoning process . . . legislative facts [as] used to set forth 
an epistemological framework within which to view the ‘evidentiary’ or adjudicated facts of 
a case” and “ ‘pure’ legislative facts that ‘help the tribunal to determine the content of law 
and policy’ ” (citing Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Admin-
istrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942)); see also Peggy C. Davis, ‘There Is a 
Book Out . . .’: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1539 (1987); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed 
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1988) (distinguishing adjudicative from legislative facts 
and giving examples of legislative facts); Woolhandler, supra note 167, at 114-15.  
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lar conclusion,198 such as the case in which a judge gives the follow-
ing jury instruction: “When deciding whether the defendant acted 
reasonably, you are to do so from the perspective of someone, pos-
sessing ordinary skills . . . .” The second category, adjudicative-
legislative, comprises facts which decide issues in a way that would 
have “ ‘no substantive implications beyond the specific case in which 
[they are] introduced.’ ”199 The third category —also referred to col-
lectively as “premise facts”200—includes nonadjudicative legislative 
facts which may not only influence the case-specific outcomes, but 
seek normative recognition as a guide for future law or policy.201 This 
Section focuses on the second and third type of legislative facts.  
 Adjudicative and nonadjudicative legislative facts often transcend 
ordinary factual determinations and can be of a sociological,202 politi-
cal,203 economic,204 scientific,205 historical,206 or legislative207 nature. 
 198. Stephani, supra note 197, at 518-19. An example of an adjudicative-legislative fact 
is data from economic events submitted to demonstrate the inability of a crude oil 
broker to comply with a contract. Mainline Inv. Corp. v. Gaines, 407 F. Supp. 423, 427 
(N.D. Tex. 1976).  
 199. Stephani, supra note 197, at 520-21 (quoting John Monahan & Laurens Walker, 
Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science Law, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 491 (1986)). 
 200. Keeton, supra note 197, at 8. Of course, the distinction between adjudicative and 
nonadjudicative legislative facts can be a fine one. For example, there are numerous in-
stances under which legislative facts introduced by the parties to prove case-specific propo-
sitions will take on normative characteristics if used to support new legal norm. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 201. Keeton, supra note 197, at 11. Legislative facts “are those which have relevance to 
legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle 
or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.” Id. at 58 (emphasis 
omitted). Legislative facts “are facts that ‘inform[ ] a court’s legislative judgment on ques-
tions of law and policy.’ ” Woolhandler, supra note 167, at 111 (quoting Kenneth Culp 
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 404 (1942)); see also Stephani, supra note 197, at 519.   
 202. “Sociological facts” are best described as propositions that are general in nature 
and describe the status or condition of a subject. The Supreme Court’s take on social sci-
ence began with the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding, 
based on sociological studies, that because of “inherent” differences between the sexes, fac-
tories could limit women’s work hours). Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on 
Appeal and the Decision Making Process, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 198 (2004). For another 
example, see Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), where 
the court of appeals apparently classified the district court’s finding that “sexual orienta-
tion is set in at a very early age” as a sociological fact. Id. at 265 n.1.   
 203. See, e.g., Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (political uprising in 
Fiji); Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 204 (9th Cir. 1957) (struggle for power in Croa-
tia), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 462 
(S.D. Fla. 1959) (political “events and occurrences in Cuba”). 
 204. See, e.g., Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 
(E.D. Cal. 1983) (nonsubstitutability of electric power); Mainline Inv. Corp. v. Gaines, 407 
F. Supp. 423, 427 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799 (2d Cir. 1992) (theories be-
hind DNA testing); Laster v. Celotex Corp., 587 F. Supp. 542, 543 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (the 
scientific facts pertaining to asbestosis and mesothelioma); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
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Legislative facts can be introduced into controversies either by the 
litigants or the judges themselves. To use Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion208 as an example of the former, evidence demonstrating the dev-
astating psychological effect of racial segregation and discrimination 
upon African-American children’s self esteem was introduced by the 
plaintiffs, and the defendants were given the chance to undermine 
and contradict that evidence. In other cases, however, judges (at both 
trial and appellate levels) may engage in their own independent in-
vestigation to develop nonadjudicative legislative facts to inform 
their findings and legal determinations.209
 From an evidentiary perspective, the procedural method by which 
trial judges introduce legislative facts varies. Legislative facts may 
be introduced through expert testimony, as in Brown. Furthermore, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows judges to take judicial notice of 
certain facts so long as they are undisputed and either “generally 
known” or “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”210 Rule 
201 speaks explicitly only of judicial notice of adjudicative facts and 
does not explicitly mention legislative facts.211 Yet legislative facts, 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (the etiology of asbestos 
disease), rev’d on other grounds, 789 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 206. An example would be the “historical” fact that the Japanese were in control of the 
Philippine Islands between May 1942 and October 1944, for purposes of determining 
whether the petitioner was deprived of information regarding its property. Standard-
Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 339 U.S. 157, 159 (1950) (“It might be assumed in favor 
of petitioner’s pleadings what is judicially known, that the Japanese were, for all practical 
purposes, in complete control of the Philippine Islands by May 1942 and continued in con-
trol until sometime subsequent to October 1944, when the United States Army returned.”). 
 207. “Legislative” fact here is meant as it is most commonly understood, that is, a stat-
ute’s or regulation’s history or a judicial opinion. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 335 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Laws of other jurisdictions, special 
rules, ordinances, and judicial opinions are also termed legislative facts, even though they 
are treated as adjudicative for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 60 AM. JUR.
3d Proof of Facts § 10. Such facts have also been classified as judicial notice of law. 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 261, 294 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 209. Judges may do so by reviewing research, articles, lecture transcripts, or research 
submitted by amici. Keeton, supra note 197, at 30. See also Federal Rule of Evidence 
201(f), which allows the taking of judicial notice “at any stage of the proceeding[s].” Id.
This has been interpreted to enable even appellate judges to take judicial notice of facts. 
See, e.g., Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Camp, 723 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1984); Gov’t of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 210. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
 211. Keeton, supra note 197, at 10; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 207, at 555; 
but see FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (envisioning facts subject to “judicial 
notice” in a much broader sense). Advisory Committee Comments to Rule 201 seem to en-
vision facts subject to “judicial notice” in a broader sense. For purposes of Rule 201, 
“whether a fact is adjudicative or legislative depends not on the nature of the fact . . . but 
rather the use made of it (that is, whether it is a fact germane to what happened in the 
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particularly those which decide case-specific outcomes, are in one 
sense “adjudicative,” and they can be judicially noticed.212
 As adjudicative and nonadjudicative legislative facts presume no 
preexisting legal norm,213 like constitutional facts, they carry pro-
found implications. Once again, Brown provides a clear illustration. 
In Brown, the socioscientific facts were not, in the strictest sense, 
historical facts. They were, however, adjudicative-legislative facts of 
a sociological nature. That social science data proved famously com-
pelling and was decisive in the appellants’ ultimate victory against 
the appellee school districts. Moreover, the socioscientific factual 
conclusion that racial segregation and discrimination have a demon-
strated adverse impact on African Americans was a basis for over-
turning Plessy v. Ferguson,214 and it became a normative policy 
proposition that would go on to influence subsequent challenges to 
racial segregation in other aspects of life. 
 A strict reading of Rule 52(a) would allow for review of any legis-
lative fact only for clear error. However, facts classified as legislative 
are never reviewed on that basis. The standard of review possible 
appears to depend upon its purpose (adjudicative or nonadjudica-
tive), its subtype (for example, scientific or historical), and the 
method by which it is introduced.  
 To use Brown again as an example: the trial judge’s rejection of 
the socioscientific facts introduced by the plaintiffs’ experts would 
have been reviewed with the highest deference if Rule 52(a) were 
strictly applied. Theoretically, had those facts been rejected after a 
proffer for judicial notice under Rule 201, review would turn upon 
whether the trial court abused its discretion—an even more deferen-
tial standard.215 Viewed as a normative proposition, the trial 
court’s rejection of the fact that segregation and discrimination 
case, or a fact useful in formulating common law policy or interpreting a statute).” United 
States v. Bellow, 194 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 212. Compare Laster v. Celotex Corp., 587 F. Supp. 542, 543 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (the sci-
entific “facts pertaining to whether asbestosis and mesothelioma are caused by exposure to 
asbestos are ‘adjudicative facts’ under Rule 201”), with United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 
786, 799 (2d Cir. 1992) (theories behind DNA testing), and Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“The etiology of asbestos 
disease is not an adjudicative fact for this claim.”), rev’d on other grounds, 789 F.2d 214 (3d 
Cir. 1986); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 207, at 290-91. 
 213. Woolhandler, supra note 167, at 114 (legislative facts “do not presume a pre-
existing legal norm because by definition such facts are used to create law”). 
 214. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 215. Judicial notice is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., MacGregor v. 
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 373 F.3d 923, 933 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 
215, 251-253 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Collier, 68 Fed. Appx. 676, 682 (6th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Wolny, 
133 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1998); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 
128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d 1338, 1342 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
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imposes psychological harm on African-American children could 
have been reviewed de novo as a case-specific legislative-
adjudicative fact or independently found by the Supreme Court as 
a nonadjudicative legislative fact.216
VI.   SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
FACTS
 As mentioned earlier, judgments upon constitutional and legisla-
tive facts (even the judgment as to whether they are present or ab-
sent) have far-reaching social, moral, and/or political ramifications. 
Consequently, specific issues regarding constitutional and legislative 
facts warrant elaboration.
A.   Constitutional Fact Review 
 Plainly, the constitutional fact doctrine allows appellate courts to 
encroach upon the trial court’s province of fact finding. Constitu-
tional facts are facts nonetheless, and independent review then vio-
lates the allocation of authority and responsibility principles Rule 
52(a) sets forth. Moreover, the doctrine has contributed to what crit-
ics view as an expansion of what can be called a constitutional 
fact.217 Those commentators see this expansion going so far as to 
create new rights and obligations under the Constitution where 
none formerly existed.  
 A second source of concern assumes the legitimacy of the constitu-
tional fact doctrine. While the nature of constitutional facts suggests 
that such facts be reviewed under a heightened standard, commenta-
tors wonder whether de novo review is imperative in all cases in 
which constitutional facts arise.218 Traditional de novo appellate re-
 216. Appellate scrutiny of legislative facts may vary depending upon the reliability and 
verifiability of the fact itself. For example, historical data accounting for a political upris-
ing to support an asylum claim may be seen as noncontroversial and not open to reason-
able dispute. On the other hand, social science data offered to demonstrate conviction-
proneness of jurors in capital murder trials should not enjoy clear error deference, due in 
part to methodological weaknesses. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-69 n.3 
(1986) (noting that two courts of appeals reached different conclusions from the same social 
science evidence offered; “We are far from persuaded, however, that the ‘clearly erroneous’ 
standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of ‘legislative’ facts at issue here.”). 
 217. See Strong, supra note 196, at 279-82 (need to limit the expansion of the doctrine); 
see also Christie, supra note 99, at 26 (Interpreting Dickinson, Christie says that constitu-
tionality depends on “reasonableness,” and since reasonableness encompasses “many, if not 
most of the factual determinations that must be given made in a given case, then there is 
no limit to judicial re-examination.”). But see Pine, supra note 196, at 703 (offering a meth-
odology for determining an act/omission’s constitutionality); see also Monaghan, supra note 
96, at 275; Schecter, supra note 196, at 1511 (independent review of constitutional facts 
should be determined on a flexible basis).  
 218. Strong, supra note 196, at 264; see also Monaghan, supra note 96, at 263; Schec-
ter, supra note 196, at 1511.  
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view is limited to those instances when it is important not to only de-
clare law, but to expand upon legal norms. However, not all constitu-
tional facts trigger the need to elaborate upon legal norms or estab-
lish a new legal norm.219 De novo review, then, should be undertaken 
only when the application of law involves a significant measure of 
“norm elaboration” or the need “to ‘say what the law is.’ ”220
 The most overwhelming concern related to the constitutional fact 
doctrine also assumes its validity, but questions why the Supreme 
Court has refused to apply it in certain cases in which race and dis-
crimination are at issue. While “preserving precious liberties” in 
cases involving the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, 
the Supreme Court has not invoked the doctrine in Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection cases where discriminatory intent 
based on race was placed squarely into controversy. Thus, in cases 
involving preemptory challenges,221 racial gerrymandering,222 and
school segregation,223 the Supreme Court has held fast to the Rule 
52(a) clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court has also held 
that clear error applies when reviewing determinations on discrimi-
natory intent in Title VII cases.224
 Put bluntly, it is difficult to discern a principled reason why this 
inconsistency exists. Using Concrete Works and Easley as examples, 
“discrimination” and “strong basis in evidence” are two legal concepts 
at issue. With each, the core questions (Because of race? How perva-
sive was past discrimination?) are evidentiary. Yet the historical 
 219. See Monaghan, supra note 96, at 264 (offering a middle ground where de novo re-
view is mandated only when law application in the case requires elaboration upon the legal 
norm elaboration, not if the case is one “simply” of norm reiteration).  
 220. Id.
 221. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 367 (1991) (findings of voluntari-
ness or actual malice involve legal, as well as factual, elements); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 402 (1945) (stating that the finding that 
grand jury selection that excluded Latinos was not made with discriminatory intent would 
be reviewed with “great respect to the conclusions of the state judiciary”). 
 222. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 620-23 
(1982) (at large elections alleged to dilute African-American voting in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, finding reviewed for clear error); Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Af-
fairs Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 209 F.3d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 2000) (whether Voting Rights 
Act Section 2 violation occurred in 1994 reapportionment was a question of fact to be re-
viewed for clear error) (adopting Thornburg v. Gingles, 468 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)); Cousin 
v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (whether dilution of African-American vote 
in county at-large judicial election process intentionally discriminated on the basis of race 
was a question of fact). 
 223. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979) (the question as to 
whether the school board intentionally operated a dual, segregated school system reviewed 
for clear error by court of appeals).  
 224. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S 273 (1986) (district court finding 
that company’s seniority system intentionally discriminated against African-American 
employees reviewed for clear error); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 
573 (1985) (in Title VII sex discrimination case, a “finding of intentional discrimination is a 
finding of fact, and therefore is entitled to appropriate deference”).  
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facts serve to inform the “ultimate” question, and the response (with-
out inference or comparison) directly triggers the constitutional right 
or obligation.  
 In Bose, the Supreme Court ruled that a decision as to whether a 
libel was committed with actual malice must be reviewed de novo, in-
cluding all subsidiary facts going to intent to demonstrating its pres-
ence or absence. Why the question as to whether a journalist acted 
with “actual malice” is a “precious liberty” worthy of preservation 
through independent appellate review, yet the rights and obligations 
attendant to race discrimination and remedial affirmative action 
measures are reviewed with the highest deference raises a distress-
ing double standard.225 To accord determinations on consequential 
matters of race and rights less scrutiny than speech diminishes the 
value of a most vital component of constitutional protections.226
B.   Legislative Fact Review 
 Legislative facts, with their various subclasses, equally evade 
Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard. While such facts are found to estab-
lish or extend legal norms, doctrinal and reliability concerns abide in 
their acceptance and use. Rules of evidence do not adequately ac-
count for their introduction and acceptance. In addition, inconsistent 
regard for or weight given to legislative facts serves to undermine 
Rule 52(a)’s purpose, raising both systemic and procedural tensions. 
1.   Legislative Fact Finding, Separation of Powers, and Judicial 
Competency
 Critics of judicial reception of legislative facts see it as a clear vio-
lation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. Under that doctrine, 
Congress has been granted broad discretion in choosing which 
policies to pursue and which laws to make. Moreover, legislatures 
 225. At first blush, the majority in Easley could be seen as trying to push the question 
of race and intent into constitutional fact/de novo territory when it refers to the “constitu-
tionally critical” nature of the question. Easley, 532 U.S. at 240. Weighing against that 
conclusion, however, is the fact that the majority made no express case for treating race 
and intent as a constitutional fact and its lack of citation to precedent. Had the majority 
explicitly characterized the race and intent determination as one of constitutional fact, de
novo review would have certainly yielded the same result.  
 226. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 624 F.2d 525, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980), rev’d, 456 
U.S. 273 (1982) (while “discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at the 
same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case. . . . As such, a finding of discrimi-
nation or nondiscrimination is a finding of ultimate fact. . . . In reviewing the district 
court’s findings, therefore, we will proceed to make an independent determination of appel-
lant’s allegations of discrimination . . . .”); see also Larson, supra note 169, at 209 (who 
feels that de novo review of a fact case may be warranted wherever constitutional facts 
might arise or in “constitutional rights” cases). As this issue begs further analysis, particu-
larly from positive law and critical race perspectives, it will be the subject of an upcoming 
treatment by this author. 
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have greater institutional experience and capacity to collect and 
analyze evidence used in making policy determinations or develop-
ing new legal norms.  
 Conversely, courts are at an institutional disadvantage with re-
gard to capably and competently finding legislative facts. The com-
parative amount of human and financial resources allocated to the 
federal court system does not allow for the extensive fact finding 
some consider appropriate to craft broadly applicable legal norms. 
Moreover, legislative fact finding by a court is dictated by the issues 
presented in cases before the court. The selection of the law to be 
made—even the question of whether law on a particular issue should 
be made at all—is a matter which should arguably be subject to the 
debate and scrutiny of legislative processes.227 Of special concern are 
cases in which judges engage in independent inquiry to advance pol-
icy norms or declare law, as those acts appear most to resemble 
legislative functions.228 Thus, legislative facts found by appellate 
courts—whether adjudicative or nonadjudicative—are seen as ab-
rogating congressional authority and distorting the democratic 
functions of government. 
2.   Fundamental Deficiencies of Legislative Fact Finding 
 The nature of scientific inquiry itself is another reason critics urge 
against legislative facts in the judicial process. Research serving as a 
basis for legislative fact finding carries inherent problems, as it can 
be methodologically and statistically infirm. Contributing to the in-
firmity is that such facts are intrinsically value-laden, as every re-
search inquiry is a product of selective problem identification and 
evidence assessment. The value bias is compounded when adjudica-
tive-legislative facts are derived by litigants through expert testi-
mony or otherwise.229 The adversarial system has developed incen-
tives for counterpresentation of legislative facts, and when a given 
 227. Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases Af-
ter Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2316 (1998) (noting “the comparative le-
gitimacy of lawmaking” as between the judicial and legislative branch due to the latter’s 
“superior institutional capacity to collect evidence”). 
 228. See, e.g., discussions surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the majority made reference to international laws, 
policies, and customs to advance the argument that Texas sodomy law should be found un-
constitutional; see also Davis, supra note 197, at 1602; Woolhandler, supra note 167, at 122 
(noting that reformists must address the legitimacy issue with this regular reception of 
legislative facts, as courts are already attacked for “arrogating” the role of lawmakers); 
Note, supra note 227, at 2314.  
 229. See William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the 
First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261, 1286 (1998).  
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set of legislative facts prevails as normative propositions, the sound-
ness of that policy or law must be called into serious question.230
C.   Summary 
 The expansive nature of appellate review through the use of con-
stitutional, legislative, and other nonhistorical facts has brought 
about critical systemic tensions. In congress with the malleable na-
ture and the circumvention or avoidance of Rule 52(a), appellate 
courts introduce a critical procedural determination into their judg-
ment by classifying facts. The question becomes whether a standard 
of review determination is based upon principle or whether Rule 
52(a) is urged, rejected, or circumvented by fact typology because of a 
judge’s ideological bias. Revisiting Concrete Works, Easley, and 
Equality Foundation may provide some answers. 
VII.   RULE 52(A) AND FACT TYPOLOGY AS IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS?
CONCRETE WORKS, EASLEY, AND EQUALITY FOUNDATION REVISITED
A.   In Concrete Works, Was Justice Scalia Advocating Clear Error 
Review on Principle or Because of Ideological Bias Against 
Affirmative Action Programs? 
 Justice Scalia’s argument for clear error in his 2003 Concrete 
Works dissent, more than anything, reflects his skepticism towards 
affirmative action programs. What made Justice Scalia’s standard of 
review argument suspect is its timing. If there were a genuine issue 
as to whether a strong basis in evidence conclusion was reviewable 
for clear error only, then that procedural mistake was ripe for correc-
tion in the 1994 Concrete Works appeal. At that time, the Tenth Cir-
cuit first announced that de novo should be the standard of review.231
Yet petition for certiorari of that decision was denied unanimously, 
 230. For example, many questions abound regarding the introduction, use, and appel-
late review of sociological facts. Some of those questions involve the nature of sociological 
inquiry. Commentators have noted the inherent problem that social scientists have yet to 
offer theories that predict human behavior with certainty; that these theories are value-
laden, subject to fluctuating data; and that the legal process lacks a standard by which to 
measure its relevance or to effectively evaluate and use them. David L. Faigman, To Have 
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 
EMORY L.J. 1005, 1040 (1989); see also Stephani, supra note 197, at 518 (“ ‘[T]he court’s 
untrammeled freedom in the law-ascertaining process and sometimes on the ground that a 
requirement of indisputability seems inappropriate . . . where the facts are often general-
ized and statistical and where their use is more nearly argumentative, or as a help to 
value-judgments, than conclusive or demonstrative.’ ” (citation omitted)); Woolhandler, su-
pra note 167, at 123. 
 231. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1522 
(10th Cir. 1995) (“Ultimately, whether a strong basis in evidence of past or present dis-
crimination exists, thereby establishing a compelling interest for the municipality to enact 
a race-conscious ordinance is a question of law.”). 
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with no opinion from Justice Scalia correcting what he later saw as a 
dispositive procedural error.232
 Three years later, a split among the circuits arose as to the appli-
cable standard of review on the “strong basis in evidence” determina-
tion. In 1997 the Eleventh Circuit issued a ruling in Engineering 
Contractors Ass’n of South Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County 
which noted that such a determination is to be reviewed for clear er-
ror and affirmed the unconstitutionality of Miami-Dade County’s set-
aside program.233 Supreme Court certiorari was unanimously denied, 
with no attempt by Justice Scalia to reconcile the emergent conflict 
with Concrete Works.234 A year earlier, in Contractors Ass’n of East-
ern Pennsylvannia v. City of Philadelphia,235 the First Circuit had 
struck down Philadelphia’s minority set-aside program and engaged 
in de novo review. Certiorari was denied there as well, with no effort 
by Justice Scalia to correct the standard of review determination.236
Thus, on three occasions before his Concrete Works dissent, Justice 
Scalia had an opportunity to express disagreement as to the proper 
standard of review, but did not. The only case in which Justice Scalia 
criticized the appellate standard of review was the one that up-
held a minority set-aside program: Concrete Works. Justice 
Scalia’s argument for clear error review comes across as either (1) 
post-hoc justification or (2) a proxy through which to strike Den-
ver’s minority set-aside program. 
 Lending force to this observation is the effort Justice Scalia exerts 
reexamining the trial court evidence to demonstrate that Denver’s 
program was constitutionally infirm. To demonstrate a “strong basis 
in evidence” for the program, the Tenth Circuit held that Denver was 
not required to “prove the existence of past discrimination” as the 
district court had thought; Denver could meet its burden by a proffer 
of “strong evidence from which an inference of past and present dis-
crimination could be drawn.”237 Justice Scalia felt that the district 
court got the law right. He vigorously defended the district court’s ar-
ticulation of the law and extensively reviewed the evidence supporting 
its conclusion. In doing so, however, Justice Scalia espoused a view not 
 232. City & County of Denver v. Concrete Works, 514 U.S. 1004 (1995). 
 233. Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 903, 929 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
 234. Metro. Dade County v. Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla., 523 U.S. 1004 (1998) 
(denying certiorari). 
 235. 91 F.3d 586 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 236. City of Philadelphia v. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 519 U.S. 1113 (1997) (denying 
certiorari).
 237. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 970 (10th 
Cir. 2003).  
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shared by seven of his fellow Justices and imposed upon Denver a 
burden of proof never established by Supreme Court precedent.238
B.   Did the Easley Majority Give Heightened Scrutiny to the District 
Court Decision Because of Its Solicitude Toward Minority Voting 
Interests?
 The majority’s approach in Easley marked perhaps the clearest 
example of how Rule 52(a) is circumvented to overturn a decision 
which the majority opposes. The justifications for heightened clear 
error (that is, that the “trial was not long,” that there was no inter-
mediate review, the voluminous documentary evidence, and the ab-
sence of credibility or demeanor determinations)239 find no basis 
whatsoever in Rule 52(a). If such conditions were to control Rule 
52(a) applicability, then appellate review would hardly be consis-
tent—and certainly not predictable. In this regard, Justice Thomas’s 
dissenting opinion is most compelling and correct.
 By sidestepping Rule 52(a) to engage in that extensive review 
however, the majority was able to reach and redecide an issue which 
represented a fundamental ideological divide on the Supreme Court: 
the degree to which the law should reinforce assumptions about Afri-
can Americans and voting behavior. From its review of the evidence, 
the majority found “undisputed evidence that racial identification is 
highly correlated with [Democratic] political affiliation in North 
Carolina.”240 That finding was determinative in showing that politics,
not race, was the predominant motive in drawing the majority-
minority Twelfth Congressional District.  
 238. Justice Scalia felt that “[t]he Tenth Circuit interpreted the ‘strong basis in evi-
dence’ requirement in a miserly manner and ignored Croson’s requirement that the gov-
ernment prove that it is remedying identified discrimination.” Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. 
v. City and County of Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1030 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet Cro-
son made no such requirement. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., the Supreme 
Court stated that in meeting the burden to show a “strong basis in evidence of past dis-
crimination, . . . the inference of discriminatory exclusion can arise from statistical dispari-
ties.” 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989). In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, another Supreme 
Court case on point, the plurality opinion stated that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
require a court to make an ultimate judicial finding of discrimination before a municipality 
may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination.” 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and White, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). And while Justice Scalia relied upon Shaw v. Hunt for his position 
as well, that case distinguished the need to identify past or present discrimination with 
some specificity from the required demonstration of a “strong basis in evidence” that reme-
dial action was necessary. See 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (First, the discrimination must 
be “identified discrimination.” Second, the institution that makes the racial distinction 
must have had a “strong basis in evidence” to conclude that remedial action was necessary, 
“before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.”(citations omitted)). 
 239. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 235 (2001). 
 240. Id. at 243.
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 Justice Thomas took umbrage at the assumption underlying that 
conclusion, which he characterized as a “ ‘stereotype’ about African-
American voting behavior.”241 In his urge to defer to the district 
court’s conclusion, Justice Thomas expressed a theme that has 
coursed through his opinions regarding race and rights: the law’s ac-
commodation of assumptive racial behavior. Furthermore, he has 
openly insisted that the law be construed in a manner to provoke mi-
nority assimilation; in the case of voting rights this can be accom-
plished through influence and coalition-building.242 Thus, to Justice 
Thomas, the Twelfth Congressional District, in the way it was 
drawn, reflected what he viewed as an unnecessary, outmoded, and 
even harmful protection of minority interests. To Justice Thomas, 
the district configuration also perpetuated an antiassimilation ideol-
ogy, one which the district court rejected and the Supreme Court 
should have as well through clear error review.  
C.   Was the Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation Correct in Its 
Characterization of the District Court’s Factual Findings or Did It 
Apply De Novo Review Because It Was Ideologically Opposed to the 
Trial Court Decision? 
 The Equality Foundation litigation represents the instance in 
which the trial court fails to articulate factual findings in a way 
which shields appellate review. It also represents the instance in 
which the undisciplined application of fact typology signals the pos-
sibility of ideological bias. For purposes of this discussion, it is help-
ful to extract a few representative findings as articulated by the dis-
trict court and place them into a typology.
[Finding of Fact #5] [sic] Sexual behavior is not necessarily a good 
predictor of a person’s sexual orientation. [sociological fact] 
[Finding of Fact #13] Homosexuals have suffered a history of per-
vasive irrational and invidious discrimination in government and 
private employment, in political organization and in all facets of so-
ciety in general, based on their sexual orientation. [historical fact] 
 241. Id. at 257. 
 242. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (redefining the “effective exer-
cise of the electoral franchise” for purposes of a retrogression analysis). In sanctioning sub-
stantive rather than descriptive representation, the Court held that states need not create 
congressional districts which make it certain, but simply “likely . . . that minority voters 
will be able to elect candidates of their choice.” Id. at 482. The Court stated that minority 
groups should be expected to “pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground” 
through influence and coalition districts. Id. at 481-82; see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 
874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ascribing to the substantive representation phi-
losophy whereby “minorities unable to control elected posts would not be considered essen-
tially without a vote; rather, a vote duly cast and counted would be deemed just as ‘effec-
tive’ as any other. If a minority group is unable to control seats, that result may plausibly 
be attributed to the inescapable fact that, in a majoritarian system, numerical minorities 
lose elections.”). 
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[Finding of Fact #15] Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifi-
able group based on their sexual orientation and their shared his-
tory of discrimination based on that characteristic. [sociological fact] 
[Finding of Fact #19] No Federal laws prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Furthermore, voter back-lash around 
the country has lead [sic] to the repeal of numerous laws prohibit-
ing discrimination against gays, lesbians and bisexuals. In 38 of 
the approximately 125 state and local communities where some 
sort of measure prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation has been adopted, voter initiated referendums have been 
placed on the ballot to repeal those gains. 34 of the 38 were ap-
proved. [law-legislative fact] 
[Finding of Fact #20] The amount of resources spent by the City on 
processing and investigating discrimination complaints by gays, 
lesbians and bisexuals is negligible. City resources spent on proc-
essing and investigating all sexual orientation discrimination 
complaints is negligible. [historical fact]243
 243. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 264 
(6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, judgment vacated by 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). Here are the dis-
trict court’s findings in full, with an attempt to place them within the typology:  
1. Homosexuals comprise between 5 and 13% of the population. [sociological fact] 
2. Sexual orientation is a deeply rooted, complex combination of factors includ-
ing a predisposition towards affiliation, affection, or bonding with members of 
the opposite and/or the same gender. [socioscientific fact] 
5. [sic] Sexual behavior is not necessarily a good predictor of a person’s sexual 
orientation. [socioscientific fact] 
6. Gender non-conformity such as cross-dressing is not indicative of homosexu-
ality. [socioscientific fact] 
8. [sic] Sexual orientation is set in at a very early age—3 to 5 years—and is not 
only involuntary, but is unamenable [sic] to change. [socioscientific fact] 
9. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform, 
contribute to, or participate in, society. [historical fact] 
10. There is no meaningful difference between children raised by gays and les-
bians and those raised by heterosexuals. Similarly, children raised by gay and 
lesbian parents are no more likely to be gay or lesbian than those children 
raised by heterosexuals. [socioscientific fact] 
11. There is no correlation between homosexuality and pedophilia. Homosexu-
ality is not indicative of a tendency towards child molestation. [socioscientific fact] 
12. Homosexuality is not a mental illness. [scientific fact] 
13. Homosexuals have suffered a history of pervasive irrational and invidious 
discrimination in government and private employment, in political organiza-
tion and in all facets of society in general, based on their sexual orientation. 
[historical fact] 
14. Pervasive private and institutional discrimination against gays, lesbians 
and bisexuals often has a profound negative psychological impact on gays, les-
bians and bisexuals. [socioscientific fact] 
15. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifiable group based on their sexual 
orientation and their shared history of discrimination based on that character-
istic. [sociological fact] 
16. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are often the target of violence by heterosexu-
als due to their sexual orientation. [historical fact] 
17. In at least certain crucial respects, gays, lesbians and bisexuals are rela-
tively politically powerless. [sociopolitical fact] 
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 If one accepts the validity of fact classification, many of those 
found by the trial court can fairly be characterized as sociological or 
adjudicative-legislative facts. For example, the trial court’s finding 
that “[g]ays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifiable group based 
on their sexual orientation” is a fact of constitutional dimensions, as 
it immediately compels an equal protection analysis. The socioscien-
tific fact that “[s]exual behavior is not necessarily a good predictor of 
a person’s sexual orientation” upends the premise of Bowers v. 
Hardwick,244 which conflated sexual orientation and sexual conduct 
to find that antisodomy criminal statutes violate no constitutionally 
protected rights of gays and lesbians. By seeking to establish new 
policy or extend legal norms, those facts viewed by an appellate court 
would not be shielded by Rule 52(a) deference.  
 The Sixth Circuit, however, did not explicitly place the factual 
findings in specific categories, painting them all with only a broad 
brush of plenary review. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit gave no consid-
eration to the possibility that some findings, such as “[t]he amount of 
resources spent by the City on processing and investigating discrimi-
nation complaints by gays, lesbians and bisexuals is negligible,” 
should have been reviewed for clear error. Similarly, the district 
court’s finding that “[n]o Federal laws prohibit discrimination based 
on sexual orientation” was a statement on the status of the law, 
18. Coalition building plays a crucial role in a group’s ability to obtain legisla-
tion in its behalf. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals suffer a serious inability to form 
coalitions with other groups in pursuit of favorable legislation. [sociopolitical fact] 
19. No Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Fur-
thermore, voter back-lash around the country has lead [sic] to the repeal of 
numerous laws prohibiting discrimination against gays, lesbians and bisexuals. 
In 38 of the approximately 125 state and local communities where some sort of 
measure prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation has been 
adopted, voter initiated referendums have been placed on the ballot to repeal 
those gains. 34 of the 38 were approved. [law-legislative fact] 
20. The amount of resources spent by the City on processing and investigating 
discrimination complaints by gays, lesbians and bisexuals is negligible. City re-
sources spent on processing and investigating all sexual orientation discrimi-
nation complaints is negligible. [historical fact] 
21. The inclusion of protection for homosexuals does not detract form [sic] the 
City’s ability to continue its protection of other groups covered by the City’s 
anti-discrimination provisions. [historical fact] 
22. Amending the city Charter is a far more onerous and resource-consuming 
task than is lobbying the City Council or city administration for legislation; it 
requires a city wide campaign and support of a majority of voters. City Council 
requires a bare majority to enact or adopt legislation. [political fact] 
23. ERNSR campaign materials were riddled with unreliable data, irra-
tional misconceptions and insupportable misrepresentations about homo-
sexuals. [historical fact] 
Id. at 265. 
 244. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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which also should have been accorded clear error deference.245 The 
evidence emphasized, along with the Sixth Circuit’s failure to clearly 
discern the rationale for its pivotal de novo review decision, contrib-
uted to the ideologically driven tone of the rest of the opinion. 
 At the opinion’s outset, the Sixth Circuit characterized the trial 
court’s findings of fact as “ ‘ostensible,’ ” then cited cases to support 
its typological framework.246 Calling the finding that homosexuals 
belong to a quasi-suspect class “ ‘novel,’ ” the court invoked Bowers,
ascribing to its flawed logic that since “homosexuals generally are 
not identifiable ‘on sight’ ” they cannot be classed into a constitution-
ally recognized group.”247 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit adopted the 
antirights rhetoric of the Amendment proponents by wrongly insist-
ing that Issue 3 imposed “no punishment or disability upon persons 
belonging to that group but rather merely remove[d] previously legis-
lated special protection against discrimination from that segment of 
the population.”248 Later, the court stated that the “only effect of the 
Amendment upon Cincinnati citizens was to render futile the lobby-
ing of Council for preferential enactments for homosexuals qua ho-
mosexuals . . . the realization of their political agenda is not constitu-
tionally guaranteed . . . .”249
 The district court did fail to announce its factual findings in a way 
to shield de novo review. Without question, the trial judge could have 
articulated those findings with greater care and clarity.250 Even if he 
 245. One could even contend that, depending upon the source of this proffer (such as 
through judicial notice or extra-judicial findings), an abuse of discretion standard should 
have been applied to the finding regarding federal laws and sexual orientation. 
 246. Equal. Found., 54 F.3d at 265; see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 
n.26 (1964) (constitutional predicates such as “actual malice”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 n.16 (1984); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521-22 
(1968); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-89 (1989); Paul 
Revere Ins. Co. v. Brock, 28 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1994) (mixed questions of law and fact);
Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1989) (constitutional facts and ultimate 
facts).
 247. Equal. Found., 54 F.3d at 266-67. 
 248. Id. at 267. 
 249. Id. at 270. 
 250. For example, it can immediately be seen how Finding of Fact #15, “[g]ays, lesbians 
and bisexuals are an identifiable group based on their sexual orientation and their shared 
history of discrimination based on that characteristic,” drips with constitutional implica-
tions. Compare Justice Phyllis Hamilton’s opinion in Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), in which two Planned Parent-
hood agencies and others sought to enjoin the enforcement of Congress’s Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1531. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957. In 
finding the ban unconstitutional, Justice Hamilton set forth very specific witness back-
grounds and qualifications, and expert backgrounds and qualifications, as well as factual 
findings. Id. Note the qualitative difference of the facts as articulated by Justice Hamilton 
and those of Justice Speigel in Equality Foundation:
1. Like the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, the Act bans abortions performed at 
any time during a pregnancy, regardless of gestational age or fetal viability. In 
fact, Congress rejected alternatives and amendments to the Act that would 
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had, the outcome may have been the same. Nonetheless, the Sixth 
Circuit was equally obligated to articulate and justify its characteri-
zation of the district court’s findings with clarity and precision. Cou-
pled with its explicit use of ideologically inflammatory rhetoric, the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion left the impression that any standard of re-
view applied was incidental to the outcome it sought.251
have limited its applicability to viable fetuses. See 149 Cong. Rec. S3600 (daily 
ed. March 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 149 Cong. Rec. H4939 (daily 
ed. June 4, 2003) (statement of Rep Greenwood); 149 Cong. Rec. H4948 (daily 
ed. June 4, 2003) (statement of Rep. Baldwin). 
2. In performing all D&Es, including D&Es by disarticulation, and inductions, 
physicians “deliberately and intentionally” extract the fetus from the woman’s 
uterus and through her vagina. Tr. Vol. 1 at 76:19-21 (Paul); Tr. Vol. 2 at 
200:23-201:4 (Sheehan); Tr. Vol. 3 at 422:3-12 (Doe); Tr. Vol. 5 at 822:0-823:12 
(Westhoff). Extraction of the fetus from the uterus, if brought through the cer-
vix and vagina (as opposed to through an incision in the woman’s abdomen), is 
called a “vaginal delivery.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 75:20-76:5 (Paul); Tr. Vol. 3 at 421:6-11 
(Doe); Tr. Vol. 5 at 822:20-823:12 (Westhoff). 
3. The fetus may still have a detectable heartbeat or pulsating umbilical cord 
when the uterine evacuation begins in any D&E or induction, and may be con-
sidered a “living fetus.” Tr. Vol.1 at 67:3-11; 76:6-18 (Paul); Tr. Vol. 2 at 201:5-8 
(Sheehan); Tr. Vol. 3 at 421:12-18 (Doe); Tr. Vol 5 at 822:20-823:12 (Westhoff); 
Tr. Vol. 11 at 1783:15-1786:3 (Chasen). 
4. Plaintiffs’ and the government’s experts agree that in any D&E or induction, 
a living fetus may be extracted in a breech presentation until some “part of the 
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 
945:17-21 (Bowes); Tr. Vol. 8 at 1283:17-20 (Shadigian); Lockwood Depo 
235:16-24; Tr. Vol. 1 at 77:9-78:13 (Paul); Tr. Vol. 1 at 99:16-2; 201:9-16 (Shee-
han); Tr. Vol.2 at 281:22-282:3 (Drey); Tr. Vol.3 at 405:4-12; 422:3-19 (Doe); Tr. 
Vol 4 at 521:2-15; 551:19-552:4 (Broekhuizen); Tr. Vols. 4 & 5 at 678:23-679:14; 
784:3-786:18 (Creinin); Tr. Vol. 5 at 822:20-823:12 (Westhoff); Tr. Vol. 11 at 
1783:15-1786:3 (Chasen).  
Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72.  
 251. See Equal. Found., 54 F.3d at 265. Proceedings subsequent to the Supreme Court 
decision Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), lend additional insight into and heightened 
suspicion toward the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Equality Foundation. In another example 
of Justice Scalia providing templates for lower courts to later adopt whether he is in the 
majority or minority, his dissent from the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand 
in light of Romer was explicitly adopted by the Sixth Circuit on remand. Equal. Found. v. 
City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). He distinguished Equality Foundation from Ro-
mer on the grounds that “the lowest ‘electoral subunit’ did not wish to ‘accord homosexuals 
special protection’ in Equality Foundation,” where in Romer, Colorado’s Issue 2 involved a 
state constitutional amendment. Id.
 On remand, the Sixth Circuit once again upheld the charter amendment’s constitu-
tionality, expanding on the argument regarding the power of municipalities to enact cer-
tain types of legislation. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997). It stood by its earlier 
ruling, but now on the grounds that a “local measure adopted by direct franchise, designed 
in part to preserve community values and character, which does not impinge upon any 
fundamental right or interest of any suspect or quasi-suspect class, carries a formidable 
presumption of legitimacy and is thus entitled to the highest degree of deference from the 
courts.” Id. at 297. The en banc petition for rehearing was denied, with six dissenting 
judges. Equal. Found. of E. Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 1998 U.S App. LEXIS 1765 (6th Cir. 
Feb. 5, 1998). Justice Gilman, in dissent, wrote: 
On remand, the panel sought to distinguish Romer on a number of grounds, 
each of which ultimately had its genesis in the rationale proferred by the dis-
senting justices in the order remanding this case for further consideration. As a 
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D.   Summary 
Concrete Works, Easley, and Equality Foundation represent three 
examples of the manner in which Rule 52(a) can be urged, circum-
vented, or avoided. In Concrete Works and Easley, the debate over 
the applicable standard acted as a filter for ideological tensions in-
volving affirmative action, race, and voting. Moreover, the arguments 
given urging or rejecting Rule 52(a) applicability were procedurally, 
if not intellectually, infirm. In Equality Foundation, while the Sixth 
Circuit was not wrong to articulate a fact typology for the district 
court’s findings, its manner in doing so failed to demonstrate an ap-
preciation of the importance of giving transparency to its choice of 
standard of review. 
 It must be acknowledged that under most circumstances on ap-
peal, choice of the applicable standard of review is not made by one 
judge. To the contrary, the choice of applicable standard arises out of 
either argument proffered by the appellants or appellees and consen-
sus amongst two or more judges. While those circumstances may 
mitigate an argument of ideological bias, they do not entirely do 
away with the possibility of ideological bias that is shared between 
judicial colleagues. Consequently, it is important to examine the 
competing interests at play when selecting the standard of review 
from an institutional perspective. 
VIII.   BALANCING THE INTERESTS SERVED BY RULE 52(A) AND FACT 
TYPOLOGY
 Through the terms ”findings of fact,” “documentary evidence,” and 
“clear error,” appellate courts have broad flexibility in determining 
whether Rule 52(a) should apply. Moreover, appellate court fact ty-
pology enables courts to circumvent or avoid Rule 52(a). The incon-
sistent application of constitutional fact doctrine and the infirmities 
of legislative fact finding have special impact upon Rule 52(a)’s func-
tion as a decisional mechanism for trial and appellate courts. It is 
important to ask: what jurisprudential interests are served or 
harmed by appellate court treatment of Rule 52(a) and fact typology? 
 To maintain institutional credibility, jurists strive for decisional 
legitimacy, administrative efficiency, and comity. Decisional legiti-
macy depends in part upon rules such as 52(a) being consistently ap-
plied. Efficiencies are maximized by eliminating redundancy, clearly 
allocating decision making responsibilities, and establishing adjudi-
cative finality. Comity is furthered through a regard for the respec-
majority of the Supreme Court obviously did not share the views of the dissent, 
using the dissent’s rationale is itself suspect. 
Id. at *11 (citation omitted). 
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tive responsibilities and authority between the trial and appellate 
courts and the competence engendered within their roles. System le-
gitimacy, efficiency, and comity are each impacted by appellate in-
terpretation of Rule 52(a) and fact typology. However, the indispen-
sable values of decisional rule legitimacy, efficiency, and comity must 
be balanced against the importance of substantive legal norm legiti-
macy through doctrinal coherence and the protection of substantive 
rights by correcting trial court error.  
A.   Appellate Interpretation of Rule 52(a) and Its Use of Fact 
Typology Protect Substantive Rights by Correcting Error and 
Legitimizing Legal Norms Through Doctrinal Coherence 
 It is asserted that the critical role of appellate courts is to correct 
trial court error so that “justice is done.” Rule 52(a), with its opera-
tive terms subject to varying interpretation and application, gives 
appellate courts discretion in assessing when factual error has oc-
curred to correct circumstances in which justice has not been done. 
Through Rule 52(a) interpretation and fact typology, appellate courts 
protect substantive rights while legitimizing substantive norms.  
1.   Appellate Court Interpretation of Rule 52(a) and Fact Typology 
Should Seek to Correct Trial Court Error to Protect Substantive 
Rights
 One believing that, above all, appellate courts have the responsi-
bility to protect litigants against trial court error views Rule 52(a) 
ambiguities and fact typology as essential. Indeed, Rule 52(a) implic-
itly recognizes that appellate courts have a “legitimacy advantage” 
given their experience and authority in considering whether the law 
has been appropriately articulated and applied. If facts found by the 
trial court lead to erroneous application of the law, substantive rights 
are at risk. Thus, to fulfill their responsibility as a “check” on the 
lower courts, appellate courts should have the flexibility Rule 52(a) 
and fact typology allows.
 Despite the near impossibility of articulating with precision when 
“clear error” has occurred, appellate courts are nevertheless suffi-
ciently guided in their review of trial court findings. The “definite 
and firm clear conviction that a mistake was made” principle calls for 
appellate exercise of the most sober judgment. That principle ade-
quately ensures that appellate courts engage in fact review in a 
manner which respects the trial court’s authority, competence, and 
systemic efficiencies. Through the “definite and firm conviction” prin-
ciple, Rule 52(a)’s legitimacy as a procedural norm is preserved.
 Appellate review of documentary evidence should also remain 
flexible to correct error and protect substantive interests. Where wit-
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ness demeanor or credibility is not in issue or where documentary 
evidence is not in dispute, appellate courts should have the authority 
to determine, on a case-by-case basis, instances in which they 
should exercise heightened review.252 Heightened review on a case-
by-case basis also allows appellate courts to carefully consider any 
possible adverse impacts upon administrative efficiency or comity 
between courts.  
 Furthermore, contrary to some concerns, advancements in tech-
nology may not lead to expanded appellate review of documentary 
evidence. First, even with advancements which make review of trial 
court processes more efficient, it still takes a great deal of time and 
effort. Second, based on current surveys, appellate judges are still re-
luctant to make credibility and demeanor determinations viewed on 
videotape (appreciating the importance of “close experience” needed 
to make such judgments).253 In addition, there is a recognition that 
even the most technologically equipped courtroom may fail to capture 
by video important events, attendants, or occurrences: the audience; 
all jurors; a fleeting expression by a judge, juror, lawyer, or litigant; 
or verbal and nonverbal behavior (such a witness’s leg, behind the 
stand, shaking as he testifies). Importantly, some appellate judges 
recognize values of decisional finality and administrative efficiency—
jurisprudential interests which video or digital documentation as a 
justification for heightened review do nothing to advance.254
2.   Appellate Court Interpretation of Rule 52(a) and Fact Typology 
Provide Doctrinal Coherence 
 Appellate court responsibility to give coherence to legal norms 
also requires the flexibility Rule 52(a) interpretation and fact typol-
ogy affords.255 While Rule 52(a) provides important guidance as to 
the degree of deference to be accorded factual findings, certain facts 
are qualitatively distinct. As was the case in Equality Foundation, a 
trial court may articulate findings of fact in a manner which ven-
tures into lawmaking. Appellate courts must be able to discern con-
stitutional, legislative, ultimate, or otherwise mixed findings of fact 
which purport to act as normative propositions. Such facts must be 
rejected, modified, or otherwise given their proper place within the 
context of existing legal doctrine. In this regard, a strict reading of 
 252. MOORE, supra note 106, at ¶ 52.04 (Rule as written supports broader review of 
findings based on nondemeanor testimony). 
 253. See Chua, supra note 133, at 611; Lederer, supra note 136, at 260. 
 254. See Lederer, supra note 136, at 261; Owen & Mather, supra note 137, at 413. 
 255. In the authority conferred upon appellate court articulation of the law, it is said 
that appellate courts enjoy a legitimacy advantage over trial courts. Monaghan, supra note 
96, at 263.
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Rule 52(a) does not adequately ensure that appellate courts are ulti-
mately responsible to say what the law is.
 Nor would a strict reading of Rule 52(a) enhance the administra-
tive efficiencies or comity created by giving appellate courts the au-
thority to give legal norms consistency. For example, it is quite pos-
sible that two district judges within the same circuit would come to 
vastly different conclusions on the evidence presented in Equality 
Foundation. Conferring the deference suggested by Rule 52(a) could 
theoretically result in conflicting laws within each circuit. Such an 
outcome would likely lead to an increase in appeals to resolve intra-
circuit conflicts.256 Thus, appellate interpretation of Rule 52(a) and 
its use of fact typology give doctrinal coherence to legal norms, pre-
serve system resources, and promote intracircuit comity.  
3.   Summary 
 The recognition that facts as well as documentary evidence can be 
qualitatively different case to case and the fugitive meaning of clear 
error are conditions best described as either unavoidable or worth 
living with. Any detriments to decisional rule legitimacy, efficiency, 
and comity which arise by appellate courts’ treatment of Rule 52(a) 
are outweighed by the need to correct lower court error, protect sub-
stantive rights, and give coherence to and legitimize legal norms. 
Rights and obligations as they relate to religious expression, speech, 
privacy, commerce, race, gender, property, and criminal justice merit 
assurance that trial courts appropriately engage in fact finding “so to 
preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Con-
stitution.”257 Rule 52(a) is fluid, not flawed, and some argue it should 
remain that way. 
B.   Appellate Court Interpretation of 52(a) and Fact Typology 
Impairs Procedural Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Comity 
 On the other hand, one might argue that appellate court treat-
ment of Rule 52(a) and the use of fact typology ignore the proposition 
that the trial court should be the finder of the facts, no matter the 
form, no matter the type.258 Unprincipled regard for Rule 52(a)’s ex-
 256. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 
688 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that statistical evidence purporting to demonstrate whether 
Indiana statute requiring face-to-face informed consent should be treated as a legislative 
fact reviewed de novo: “[O]nly treating the matter as one of legislative fact produces the 
nationally uniform approach,” which “constitutionality must be assessed at the level of leg-
islative fact, rather than adjudicative fact determined by more than 650 district judges.”). 
 257. Bose v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 465, 511 (1984). 
 258. Wright, supra note 102, at 770 (stating that the language and intent of Rule sup-
port view that “clearly erroneous” test should apply to all forms of evidence); see also
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press terms undermines legitimacy of decisional rules, reduces ad-
ministrative efficiencies, and diminishes comity.259 Moreover,
when appellate courts evade Rule 52(a)’s plain meaning as was 
done in Easley and Equality Foundation, substantive legal norms 
are impaired, as it appears that courts are not applying the law in 
a principled manner, but manipulating Rule 52(a) to reach prede-
termined outcomes.  
1.   Appellate Court Interpretation of 52(a) and Fact Typology 
Impair Procedural Legitimacy 
 Appellate courts’ approach to a clear error definition de-
legitimizes the Rule. Though “the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed”260 is the fundamental principle for de-
termining whether a trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous, ap-
pellate courts fail to offer a consistent approach regarding the 
quality or weight of the evidence needed to come to such a convic-
tion. The distinctive evidentiary meanings given clear error are 
not without difference and potentially yield vastly different out-
comes in similar cases.  
 Contributing to the concerns regarding Rule 52(a) is the lack of 
discipline with which some appellate courts articulate the chosen 
standard. Indeed, it is common to read opinions in which the stan-
dard of review is not articulated at all. In others, courts dispense 
with the standard in a short, terse sentence. In still other in-
stances, courts fail to provide the underlying rationale to support 
the use of a particular standard or the doctrinal underpinnings of 
the fact type applied.261
 Similarly, appellate courts’ approach to documentary evidence 
delegitimizes Rule 52(a). Some courts apply clear error without ex-
ception; others only apply clear error to undisputed documents.262
Some courts will review disputed or undisputed documents de novo;
others, such as the Supreme Court in Easley, will engage in “exten-
sive review for clear error” where the record was “substantially” 
documentary evidence.263   
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 110, § 2587, at 740 (demonstrating that language of rule is 
clear); Note, supra note 60, at 536. 
 259. Free review “impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of 
district courts, and multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.” Lyons v. Bd. of Educ., 
523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 260. United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 261. See, e.g., Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. 
Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 262. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 263. Id.
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 While it can be said that appellate courts are just as capable of 
making determinations based on documentary evidence as trial 
courts—whether that evidence is in traditional or more advanced 
form—that assertion misses the point. Just because appellate courts 
are capable of making the same determinations based upon docu-
mentary evidence as trial courts does not mean they should. Ration-
alizing the departure from Rule 52(a) as the Court did in Easley
hardly gives predictability as to when the clear error standard will 
apply, allowing it to be disregarded seemingly at will.  
 Classifying facts as ultimate, constitutional, or legislative (or 
some subclassification) does much more than eviscerate Rule 52(a)’s 
plain meaning. Through fact typology, appellate courts introduce a 
critical but often obscured extraprocedural determination into their 
judgment. Nonhistorical facts, which are constitutional or legislative, 
are often the most controversial and carry the highest social conse-
quence. Yet, as exemplified in Equality Foundation, courts fail to ap-
preciate the importance of transparency when invoking fact typology.  
 Easley and Concrete Works raise important questions as to 
whether and when the constitutional fact doctrine applies, with 
judgments about the “value” of the constitutional right in question 
seeming to dictate whether de novo review will apply. Both adjudica-
tive and nonadjudicative legislative facts are susceptible to bias and 
error and may be accepted or rejected based on the credence given to 
the factual proposition. In sum, extraprocedural determinations, 
whether based upon ultimate, sociological, constitutional, or legisla-
tive facts, erode the legitimacy of Rule 52(a).  
2.   Appellate Court Interpretation of 52(a) and Fact Typology 
Impairs Administrative Efficiency 
 Appellate avoidance or circumvention of Rule 52(a) and fact typol-
ogy tip the balance of efficiencies between the courts. Heightened re-
view of documentary evidence or evidence which goes to a factual 
finding somehow outside of Rule 52(a)’s plain language drains appel-
late court of decisional resources. Consequently, appellate courts may 
take fewer cases, take longer to render judgments, or sacrifice the 
quality of review with less time and attention paid. Secondly, free re-
view creates administrative redundancies in the system when appel-
late judges pore over the same evidence. Finally, expanded review of 
factual findings impairs finality. Litigants, knowing that they may 
have a second (or third) bite at the apple, may appeal more frequent-
ly264 or even be more reluctant to settle cases. This lowers litigants’ 
incentives to get it right the first time, as well as the trial courts’ in-
 264. Nangle, supra note 13, at 427. 
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centives for proper and thorough adjudication.265 As Judge Duniway 
urged, “Rule 52(a) should be construed to encourage appeals that 
are based on a conviction that the trial court’s decision has been 
unjust; it should not be construed to encourage appeals that are 
based on the hope that the appellate court will second-guess the 
trial court.”266
3.   Appellate Court Interpretation of 52(a) Fact Typology Impairs 
Comity Between the Courts 
 Circumvention or avoidance of Rule 52(a) impacts comity when 
heightened review given to trial courts’ factual findings is not based 
upon mistake or misapplication of the law. If trial judges are more 
attuned to the wellsprings of human behavior, then there seems to be 
little reason why all findings of fact should not be given the presump-
tive weight Rule 52(a) directs, regardless of their quality or nature. 
The history of Rule 52(a) has allowed trial courts to develop superior 
competence in their role as fact finder. Encroachment upon trial 
courts’ traditional role undermines the presumption of competence 
trial judges possess. Moreover, as Judge Duniway observed, an un-
principled approach to appellate review of factual findings can look a 
lot like second-guessing, the appellate court exploiting its legitimacy 
advantage over trial courts.  
 At bottom, avoidance or circumvention of Rule 52(a) and the use of 
fact typology evinces a lack of respect for the trial court’s express au-
thority and impairs trial court dignity and morale.267 Admittedly, 
trial court dignity and morale may not be inherently sufficient bases 
to argue strict adherence to Rule 52(a) if error has indeed occurred in 
either the trial court’s application or articulation of the law. But trial 
court dignity and morale are sufficient considerations to argue 
against widening appellate review which departs from Rule 52(a) 
without principle. 
4.   Summary 
 Appellate courts have exploited Rule 52(a)’s ambiguities and 
evaded its most unambiguous terms. Furthermore, through the crea-
tion of fact typology, appellate courts have given themselves the au-
thority to encroach upon the trial court’s traditional role. There can 
be little doubt that appellate interpretation of Rule 52(a) and fact ty-
pology promotes critical jurisprudential interests in correcting error, 
protecting substantive rights, and ensuring doctrinal coherence. 
However, those interests must be balanced against interests in deci-
 265. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 652.   
 266. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 114 (9th Cir. 1962) (emphasis added). 
 267. Nangle, supra note 13, at 427. 
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sional rule consistency, efficiency, and comity. Regardless of the 
qualitative differences between “pure” facts and those which articu-
late ultimate, constitutional, or legislative norms or conditions, Rule 
52(a) does not contemplate such categorization. Through effectively 
narrowing the definition of “facts” subject to clear error deference, in-
consistently treating documentary evidence, and offering variant 
definitions of clear error, appellate courts have done more than sim-
ply impair decisional rule legitimacy, administrative efficiency, and 
comity—they have rendered Rule 52(a) nearly meaningless.  
IX.   SOLUTIONS
 Appellate courts have the inherent power to establish and give 
coherence to legal norms. As drafted, Rule 52(a) gives appellate 
courts wide discretion to depart from its plain meaning. That depar-
ture is, in part, due to the process of interpretation itself. Moreover, 
the sometimes subtle distinctions between law and fact demand that 
appellate courts make fundamental judgments about the character of 
trial courts’ factual findings. Making such judgments ideally ensures 
that any legal or policy norm brought to bear in those findings leads 
to the proper development of those norms and the effective admini-
stration of justice.  
 In applying a particular standard of review, whether a finding 
rises to an ultimate, constitutional, or legislative fact is precisely 
where courts must exercise their most careful judgment because of 
the potential consequences. As demonstrated through Concrete
Works, Easley, and Equality Foundation, the judgment as to the 
character of certain facts can be the subject of profound disagree-
ment. Moreover, as reflected in those cases, Rule 52(a) can act as a 
filter through which judges channel their ideological dispositions on 
the substantive legal issues in controversy. Articulating the standard 
of review judgment in an unprincipled, undisciplined manner not 
only diminishes Rule 52(a)’s value, but casts doubt upon the sound-
ness of the decision itself. 
 There is no doubt that Rule 52(a)’s pliant terms and fact typology 
have jurisprudential value. However, reforms are warranted if Rule 
52(a) is to be preserved, its implementation given integrity, and 
charges of ideological bias mitigated.  
A.   Create Bright Lines Where They Can Be Created  
 The Rules Advisory Committee on Civil Rules can evaluate and 
implement warranted changes to Rule 52(a) which might go far in 
giving clarity and guidance to courts, litigants, and the public.  
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1.   Refine Approach to Fact Typology 
(a)   Amend Rule 52(a) to Explicitly Address Ultimate, Constitutional, 
and Legislative Facts from Clear Error Review 
 To acknowledge the existence and value of fact typologies, Rule 
52(a) should be amended to identify those types and how they should 
be reviewed. Applying de novo review to most ultimate, constitutional, 
and legislative facts has been well established. However, classifying 
facts is a largely invisible yet crucial extra-procedural determination.  
 The mere act of codification will serve an invaluable function. 
Codification brings fact typology to light. Moreover, attaching a par-
ticular standard of review to those subcategories brings transparency 
to how appellate courts are guided in applying the appropriate stan-
dard. Greater transparency also enables trial courts to better articu-
late factual findings, enhances efficiencies, and minimizes any ad-
verse impact upon the comity between the courts resulting from the 
current approach to fact classification. 
(b)   Give Consistent Reason to the Constitutional Fact Doctrine 
 The Supreme Court should treat all constitutional facts the same. 
While the distinction between “ultimate” facts which trigger a consti-
tutional norm and “pure” adjudicative facts which should enjoy clear 
error deference might sometimes blur, there are many instances 
when the distinctions are clear. “Intentional discrimination” and 
“strong basis in evidence” determinations are constitutional facts and 
should be subject to de novo review. To do so would be to acknowl-
edge the value of the constitutional right and the weight of the con-
stitutional obligations which attend those findings.  
 Clear error review of those concepts is often justified on the 
grounds that the determination turns upon assessments and judg-
ments adduced from quintessential evidentiary facts. Perhaps that is 
so, but evidence determinative of whether intentional discrimination 
or a strong basis in evidence exists is no less fact-based than evi-
dence of motive in an actual malice claim. If the constitutional fact 
doctrine is to be applied consistently and if the most vital individual 
rights and obligations (such as to be free from discrimination) are to 
be protected through heightened review, then all factual determina-
tions that directly trigger constitutional rights and obligations 
should be subject to independent review.  
(c)   Legislative Facts Should Be Subject to De Novo Review 
 Legislative facts articulated through Federal Rule of Evidence 
201(a) should remain subject to an abuse of discretion standard, as 
should legislative facts judicially noticed under Federal Rule of Evi-
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dence 201(f).268 Legislative facts established outside of Rules of Evi-
dence, however, should continue to fall under de novo review. Such 
an approach is needed to guard not just the development of coherent 
law and policy; independent review of legislative facts is critical to 
the protection of substantive rights by guaranteeing appellate scru-
tiny of facts whose validity, reliability, and predictability can often be 
distorted in the adversarial context. Importantly, independent re-
view—and independent legislative fact finding by appellate courts 
themselves—may ensure fairness in cases where there is an imbal-
ance of resources and access to experts by some parties.269
2.   Remove Documentary Evidence from Rule 52(a) or Keep It in 
and Adhere to It 
 If the documentary evidence/clear error standard is to mean any-
thing as stated in Rule 52(a), appellate courts must adhere to it 
without qualification—or remove it. Currently, appellate courts will 
engage in heightened review even when they acknowledge the record 
consists of documentary evidence, as the Supreme Court did in Eas-
ley. A choice must be made whether to continue to give express clear 
error deference to documentary evidence—or not.  
 Rule 52(a) was amended to allocate the responsibility and author-
ity for making factual findings based on documentary evidence the 
exclusive province of the trial courts. Thus, the stronger case is that 
documentary evidence, whether disputed or undisputed, should be 
reviewed for clear error. While it is true that in some instances 
documentary evidence gives trial courts no decisional advantage over 
appellate courts, that rationale seems to be an insufficient justifica-
tion for departing from Rule 52(a)’s plain meaning. Moreover, free 
review of factual findings based on documentary evidence increases 
burdens upon appellate courts, extracting high administrative costs. 
 268. One author has proposed that judicial notice provisions be fixed so that case-
specific legislative facts are taken in a manner that “assures fairness and informed delib-
eration.” Davis, supra note 197, at 1603. Another has proposed that judges, to assure fair-
ness, might do so by giving litigants the opportunity to respond when those legislative facts 
are reasonably disputed. Keeton, supra note 197, at 30-31. 
 269. Evidentiary rules should be written to clarify the important distinctions between 
adjudicative legislative facts and nonadjudicative legislative facts. It may be useful to cod-
ify the definitions of such legislative facts, explicating that the standard of review will turn 
upon the purpose, not the nature or source, for the facts proferred or placed into record. 
Keeton, supra note 197, at 32. While these proposals would be valuable, there is one seri-
ous question about a distinction between adjudicative and nonadjudicative legislative facts 
turning on whether the fact has implications beyond the case at bar: the concept of prece-
dent makes it nearly impossible to predetermine whether any legislative fact will have 
substantive implications beyond the case in which that fact is introduced. Id.
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The interests of legitimacy, efficiency, and comity outweigh any ra-
tionale for departure from Rule 52(a)’s plain meaning.270
B.   Separating “Facts” from “Law” 
 Appellate courts should clarify their approach to review by articu-
lating which factual findings are to be reviewed for clear error from 
those which should be reviewed de novo. This would mean stating 
the ultimate fact—whether that fact triggers a statutory or common 
law finding, a constitutional right or obligation, or legislative or pol-
icy articulation—with precision. Such an approach is beneficial for 
several reasons.  
 First, it demonstrates a regard for trial courts’ authority in factual 
determinations by drawing a clear line delineating those facts which 
it will give the heightened deference required by Rule 52(a). Second, 
it offers the reader a window into the appellate court process of clas-
sifying facts. Third, it exposes the degree of scrutiny a court is giving 
particular findings and the reasons why certain findings trigger clear 
error or heightened review. Whenever possible and necessary to ap-
propriately address “mixed statements of law and fact” of whatever 
nature, making such distinctions legitimizes the decision and the 
credibility of the decision makers by bringing the process of fact clas-
sification and choice of standard to the surface.  
C.   In All Circumstances, Lawyers and Trial Judges Should More 
Carefully Articulate Findings of Fact 
 For lawyers, the development of factual findings is often a diffi-
cult, anxiety-inducing task. Often, lawyers are called upon in the 
first instance to craft factual findings for the court. This poses a spe-
cial challenge for lawyers. In crafting proposed findings for the judge 
to pass upon and/or incorporate into authoritative form, lawyers per-
form the task defensively, either seeking to ensure or shield against 
appellate review. As a result, factual findings may inappropriately 
include terms or phrases which constitute legal judgments. 
 Judges at times also articulate factual findings in a manner which 
makes them vulnerable to de novo review by failing to make “pure” 
fact statements. As was evident in Equality Foundation, making a 
pure factual statement can be difficult, particularly given the sub-
stantive nature of a case where words such as “discrimination” and 
“identifiable group” are essential factual conclusions. Without doubt, 
trial judges want to craft factual findings which compel the ultimate 
 270. This is not to argue that documentary evidence which contains factual conclusions 
which trigger ultimate, constitutional, or legislative facts should not be reviewed de novo.
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legal judgment, if only to minimize the chance of reversal on appeal. 
To achieve that end, trial judges must take greater care in their con-
struction of factual conclusions and explicitly provide the factual 
bases upon which those conclusions are reached.  
D.   Acknowledge the Fact that Judges Make Law 
 Criticisms surrounding judges “legislating from the bench” too of-
ten ignore a fundamental fact: judges make law. In deciding cases 
which govern the acts in controversy and future behavior, judges en-
gage in legislative functions. Judges affirm existing legal norms, de-
clare new legal norms, and decide between competing normative 
propositions. It is the inherent function of their role. That legislative 
function should be acknowledged by judges and critics alike to take it 
out of the realm of demagoguery and enable judges to function as 
they should.  
 Certainly, judges have an obligation to engage in responsible deci-
sion making, mindful of their relationships with other institutions 
that create the rules by which we are governed. Judges’ acknowl-
edgement that they do legislate may cause them to exercise those du-
ties more responsibly by, for example, better articulating decisional 
processes such as those which occur when deciding standards of re-
view.271
E.   Live with the Outcomes 
 In arguing that a particular standard of review must attach to 
certain types of facts, it is important to consider the weight of that 
proposition. If one asserts that all facts found by a trial court should 
be reviewed only for clear error, it could mean that the Supreme 
Court would not have found the “separate but equal doctrine” uncon-
stitutional in Brown. It could also mean that Denver should have no 
set-aside program, as the district court in Concrete Works deter-
mined. However, if one believes certain facts should or must be re-
viewed de novo, one would agree with the Brown and Concrete Works
outcomes. Yet it would also mean that the Sixth Circuit was correct 
in overturning the district court’s finding that the Cincinnati 
amendment was unconstitutional in Equality Foundation.
 In short, it is no small thing to create a bright line rule as to how 
“important” facts should be reviewed on appeal. Out of considering 
 271. Davis, supra note 197, at 1540 (“When courts own up to the possibility of making 
law in response to social and scientific facts, they are more likely both to hesitate to change 
or embellish legal rules and to proceed responsibly when changes are called for.”); see also
Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 99, 107 (2002) (“[C]ourts have to be acutely aware in which category they 
are operating when deciding issues before them.”). 
2007]                          IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON? 1087 
                                                                                                                   
the substantive rights at issue, one realizes that (1) from time to 
time, trial courts protect or undermine important rights and (2) from 
time to time, appellate courts protect or undermine important rights 
as well. A “correct” result is in the eye of the beholder. 
IX.   CONCLUSION
 The ambiguities of Rule 52(a)’s text give appellate judges wide 
discretion to urge, circumvent, or avoid the Rule altogether. “Find-
ings of fact,” “clear error,” and “documentary evidence” have proven 
to be so fluid in their meaning and application that appellate review 
can narrow or widen due to their ever-changing interpretation.272
Fact typology, as categories used to classify or reclassify facts, de-
mands that appellate judges make a crucial initial determination, 
one which is often shrouded. When the use of Rule 52(a) and fact ty-
pology is undertaken in an undisciplined, unprincipled manner, 
standard of review choices may appear to be merely masking ideo-
logical predispositions. At minimum, appellate court treatment of 
Rule 52(a) and fact typology operates as a filter through which judges 
may channel their ideological predispositions. 
 The value in Rule 52(a)’s ambiguity and the essential nature of 
fact typology cannot be understated. Both allow appellate courts 
needed flexibility to respond to instances in which substantive rights 
and obligations warrant heightened consideration. Both also allow 
the more deliberative declaration, extension, or narrowing of legal or 
policy norms. However, the value added by Rule 52(a) ambiguity and 
fact typology must be mindful of the potential diminution of juris-
prudential values such as procedural legitimacy, the efficient ad-
ministration of justice, and comity between the courts.  
 In arguing that Rule 52(a) and fact typology should be more 
clearly and consistently applied, the overriding concern is for trans-
parency and decisional legitimacy. We live in a time in which the ju-
dicial system is under literal and figurative attack. Judicial inde-
pendence is threatened by the sharp ideological divide which exists 
on issues before the courts. Judges are accused not only of harbor-
ing substantive biases, but also of manipulating or ignoring proce-
dural rules to advance their biases. If Rule 52(a) and fact typology 
are treated in a principled manner, the possibility or perception of 
bias can be mitigated and their effectiveness as an ideological 
weapon dulled. 
 272. Nangle, supra note 13, at 409.  

